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BY LOUIS EISENSTEIN f
IN his statement before the 'Ways and Means Committee, Mr. Ran-
dolph E. Paul, as Tax Adviser to the Secretary of the Treasury, made the
following recommendations after briefly summarizing the "serious de-
fects" sanctioning avoidance of the existing statute:'
"(1) The estate tax should reach all property subject to a power
of appointment, whether exercised or not, other than powers express-
ly excluded by statute; (2) the powers excluded from the reach of the
estate tax should be limited to (a) powers to appoint among the de-
cedent's spouse, his descendants, and spouseg of such descendants,
(b) fiduciary powers, and (c) powers to appoint for charitable pur-
poses; (3) the executor should be authorized to obtain reimburse-
ment from the appointive property for that portion of the tax which
is attributable to such property; (4) the gift tax statute should in-
clude the exercise or surrender of all powers subject to the estate
tax."
With certain modifications this statement contains a concise resume of
the new statute as finally enacted by Congress.
2
* The opinions expressed herein represent the personal views of the author, and do
not necessarily reflect those of the Treasury Department.
t Senior Attorney, Tax Legislative Counsel's Office, Treasury Department.
1. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1942) 91. Mr. Paul's summary of existing evils reads: "Since 1918 the estate tax
has expressly included in the decedent's estate property which passes under a general
power exercised by the decedent. Experience with this provision has disclosed a number
of serious defects. The language of the statute provides a generous loophole for the
avoidance of tax if the decedent simply refrains from exercising his power. Even if the
power is exercised, principles developed by the Supreme Court and the lower courts
bar the imposition of an estate tax where the recipients appointed by the decedent are the
persons who would take the property in the absence of exercise. Finally, the existing
provision reaches only general powers, thereby granting immunity to powers of disposi-
tion which are in effect as broad as general powers although technically they do not
qualify as such under rules of property law unrelated to taxation." It is clear that Mr.
Paul's criticism is addressed solely to the evils of section 811(f) of the Code (unless
otherwise indicated, sections hereafter cited will be the latest applicable sections of the
basic tax system in either the Internal Revenue Code or subsequent amendments),
and not to section 811 (a), considered and rejected in Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. of Baltimore, 316 U. S. 56 (1942). See Eisenstein, Powers of Appointment and
Estate Taxes: 1 (1943) 52 YALE L. J. 296, 338.
2. See also general summaries in H. R. RE'. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)
57; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 55.
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BASIC FEATURES Or THE NEW STATUTE
Section 811 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the 1942
Act,3 is comparatively simple in structure, although lengthier than the
stricken provision. Under the new statute the estate tax base includes:
"any property (A) with respect to which the decedent has at the
time of his death a power of appointment, or (B) with respect to
which he has at any time exercised or released a power of appoint-
ment in contemplation of death, or (C) with respect to which he has
at any time exercised or released a power of appointment by a dis-
position intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
his death, or by a disposition under which he has retained for his life
or any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for
any period which does not in fact end before his death (i) the pos-
session or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the prop-
erty, or (ii) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any per-
son, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy tile prop-
erty or the income therefrom; except in case of a bona fide -ale for
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth."
The statute defines a power of appointment as "any power to appoint
exercisable by the decedent either alone or in conjunction with any pvr-
son", with the following two exceptions:
"(A) a power to appoint within a class which does not include
any others than the spouse of the decedent, spouse of the creator of
the power, descendants of the decedent or his spouse, descendants
(other than the decedent) of the creator of the power or his spouse,
spouses of such descendants, donees described in section 812 (d), and
donees described in section 861 (a) (3). 4 As used in this sub-para-
graph, the term 'descendant' includes adopted and illegitimate de-
scendants, and the term 'spouse' includes former spouse; and
"(B) a power to appoint within a restricted class if the decedent
did not receive any beneficial interest, vested or contingent, in the
property from the creator of the power or thereafter acquire any
such interest, and if the power is not exercisable to any extent for
the benefit of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors
of his estate."
These provisions correct the defects which have made the former statute
"an outstanding device for the avoidance of estate tax" 5 and a generous
3. Pub. L. No. 753, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 21, 1942) § 403 (hereafter cited as
Pub. L. No. 753).
4. Sections 812(d) and 861 (a) (3) allow a deduction for bequests, legacies, devises,
and transfers to specified charitable recipients.
5. See H. R. R.EP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 160; Si-.. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 232.
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source of confusion. First, a tax modestly confined to general powers is
replaced by a levy reaching all powvers, whether general, special or hybrid,
with the exception of two specifically defined powers. The amendment
thus eliminates all the uncertainty and speculation inhering in the phrase
"general power," and at the same time broadens the scope of the tax to
include nongeneral powers on the basis of tax policy rather than traditional
property categories.' There is no longer any need to forage for appropri-
ate definitions among the concepts of the common law. Second, property
subject to a taxable power at the date of the donee's death does not escape
tax by a mere refusal by the donee to exercise the power. Legal abstinence
is no longer rewarded by tax savings. Now the important factor is the
decedent's power to control the destination of the property, not his active
intervention in its devolution. Third, the abolition of the requirement of
exercise necessarily sweeps away the Grinnell doctrine and the elaborate
refinements which have fed upon it and prospered.
One more provision completes the basic structure of the new law. Sec-
tion 811 (f) (2) of the Code provides that if a power to appoint "is exer-
cised by creating another power to appoint," the first or exercised power
does not qualify as one of the excepted powers "to the extent of the value
of the property subject to such second power to appoint." This provision
is essential to the effective operation of the statute, within its policy con-
siderations, for it is designed to overcome tax avoidance by a succession
of tax exempt powers. A may erect a trust bestowing a life estate upon
B, with a special power in B to appoint among his descendants. Such a
power is exempt from tax under the new section. B may do likewise with
respect to his son C, and estate tax may thus be avoided as long as the
succession of special powers linked with life estates is recognized as valid
under the local Rule against Perpetuities. In Delaware this process may
go on forever because the applicable period of perpetuities is computed
anew from each exercise of a special power.' Section 811(f) (2), how-
6. Compare Magill, Federal Regulation of Family Settlements (1937) 4 U. or C11.
L. R.v. 265, 276, suggesting that the distinction between a general power and a special
power is perhaps logical in the case of an estate tax, as contrasted with an inheritance
tax. See, further, Federal and State Death Taxes in REPORTS TO THE JOINT CoMMIr=
oN INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION (1938) 130. But this seems to be a logic derived from
property law rather than a frank appraisal of tax policy.
7. DEL. REv. CODE (1935) c. 117, § 48. See Bettner, The Rule Against Perpeltities
as Applied to Powers of Appointment (1940) 27 VA. L. REV. 149, 164; Leach, Pcrpetuities
in a Nutshell (1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 638, 653, n. 37 and Powers of Appoiutient (1938)
24 A. B. A. J. 807, 809. While Delaware is the only state allowing a continuous proces-
sion of special powers, there is always the possibility that others may join in to procure
similar tax blessings. Experience at other points of tax incidence has sufficiently revealed
that the possibility is far from remote. Cf. California's creation in 1927 of so-called "new"
community property, 1 PAUL, FEERAL ESTATE AND Girr TAXATION (1942.) 59, 212; the
adoption of the optional community property system by Oklahoma, C. C. Harmon, I T.
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ever, breaks up this convenient parade of tax-free powers by providing
for a surrender of immunity if the initial power is exercised by creating
another.' As the committee reports emphasize, immunity is lost even if
the second power is a taxable power.' Legislative policy is, in short, defi-
nitely directed toward forcing property into the open so that the death
tax may once more fasten on family wealth."
The House bill merely provided that a power to appoint is not immune
from tax as a power of appointment if "exercised to any extent by creat-
ing another power to appoint." " The difficulty with this provision was
that it swept too far afield. A, the donee of an otherwise exempt power,
might appoint one-half of the property outright to B, and subject the other
half to a new power held by C. Despite the outright appointment the
exemption of A's power would be destroyed with respect to all the ap-
pointive assets. The House language was refined in the Senate to pro-
vide that the exemption is lost "to the extent of the value of the prop-
erty" subject to the new power, "unreduced by any precedent or subse-
quent interest not subject" to the new power. The latter qualification
makes certain, for example, that when the donee of the power creates a
C. 40 (1942) ; Daggett, The Oklahoma Commtnity Propcr4, Act-A1 Comparatie Stvd5y
(1940) 2 LA. L. Rv. 575, 585, 590; and the more recent adoption of a similar optional
system in Oregon, 1 C. C. H. 1943 Fed. Tax Service F1 0355.
S. Authority to exercise a power by creating a new power is determined, of course,
by local law. See 3 RXSTATmE xF..zT, P oPERrY (1940) § 359; Comment (1937) 50 MAny.
L. REv. 938. Cf. Matter of Kennedy, 279 N. Y. 255, 18 N. E. (2d) 146 (1938). If local
law is silent, the opinion in Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 163 (1942), indicates
that the decision of the circuit court of appeals on the local law issue will not be dis-
turbed by the Supreme Court unless it is brought to "a definite conviction of error."
See discussion infra at 548, n. 262.
9. H. R. RFP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 160; Sex. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 232. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (2), as added by
T. D. 5239, 1943 Int Rev. Bull. No. 6, at 193; U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(b) (3), as
added by T. D. 5241, 1943 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 6, at 227. (All subsequent references to the
estate or gift tax regulations dealing with powers of appointment are confined to the
additions made by the respective Treasury Decisions).
10. Compare Comment (1943) 43 COL. L. REv. 76, SO. It is completely irrelevant
for federal tax purposes, whether the appointment is outright or is in trust. In the case
of the exemption based on relationship it is sufficient that the property, including bath
life estate and remainder, may not be beneficially appointed to persons without the ex-
cepted class. That the statute contemplates appointments in trust is indicated by the
ban on successive powers, which generally operate via the trust device. But no ban was
imposed on appointments in trust as such. Otherwise the exemption would be seriously
impaired in the case of minor appointees whose needs are best satisfied by a disposition
in trust Finally, the statutory exception, aside from the proscription of successive
powers, does not depend on whether the power is exercised but on the group of possible
appointees. If an appointment in trust were authorized-as is commonly the case-and
the trustee were considered a separate individual, the power would necessarily b2 taxable,
regardless of exercise, if the trustee were not required to be an exempt relative.
11. H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) § 403(a).
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life estate in conjunction with a new power to appoint the remainder, the
entire value of the property is taxable, without any deduction for the life
estate, which is not subject to the new power.' -
ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR CHANGES
Taxable Transfers
The new statute taxes property "with respect to which the decedent
has at the time of his death a power of appointment." "3 A power out-
standing at the date of the decedent's demise need not be testamentary in
order to be taxed. Thus a power exercisable solely by deed and termin-
ated by death falls within the scope of the statute, since the decedent at the
moment of death possesses the power to direct the devolution of the prop-
erty.14 The statute also reaches such an obvious avoidance device as a
power which must be exercised within a specified period before death. For
example, the donor may provide that the power must be exercised within
two years prior to the decedent-donee's death. Nevertheless it is the de-
cedent's demise which effects the termination of the power despite any
verbalism which shifts the moment of termination to a prior date once
death occurs. 5 Language is also borrowed from section 811(d) (3), re-
12. "Thus, if the decedent has a power to appoint a fund of $100,000 within a class
consisting only of his children (which is one of the excepted powers) and by his will
exercises such power by giving one child a power to appoint $25,000 of such fund and by
making an outright appointment of $75,000, only $25,000 is includible in the decedent's
gross estate. If, however, the decedent had appointed the income from the entire fund
to such child for life with power in such child to appoint the remainder in his will, the
whole $100,000 would be included in the decedent's gross estate." SEN. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 232. See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (2). Simi-
larly, if a power is exercised by creating a second power to appoint the income from the
property during the life of the second donee, with remainder over to designated persons,
the entire value of the property is includible even though the second power is not coter-
minous with full enjoyment of the property. If the exercise is invalid under local law,
tax immunity would presumably not be lost. If a controversy over the alleged invalidity
of the exercise were settled by permitting the appointment to remain as to a portion
of the property, such portion would probably be taxed. Ci. Helvering v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. of Baltimore, 316 U. S. 56 (1942).
13. Section 811(f) (1) (A).
14. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (1); H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942) 160; SEN. REP'. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 232. Such a
power is analogous to a reserved power to revoke a trust or to alter beneficial interests,
exercisable only during the settlor's lifetime, either of which renders the trust property
taxable at death. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929); Porter v.
Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436 (1933). Cf. Chase National Bank v. United States, 278
U. S. 327 (1929). See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 7.08, 7.09.
15. H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 160-61; SEN. REv. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 232: "A power of appointment is deemed to exist at the (late
of the decedent's death where the time for the exercise of the power is determined by the
date of his death." See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (1). Cf. Fidelity-Phila-
delphia Trust Co., 34 B. T. A. 614 (1936).
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lating to reserved powers,' to provide that a power exists on the date of
the decedent's death even though its exercise is subject to a precedent
giving of notice or takes effect only on the expiration of a stated period
after its exercise "whether or not on or before the date of the decedent's
death notice has been given or the power has been exercised." 17 This
provision is apparently of a precautionary character, and might well have
been omitted except that the failure to include it might give rise to unfor-
tunate inferences in view of the explicit language in section 811 (d) (3)."
The latter section has been interpreted in the regulations as reaching re-
served powers to revoke, alter, amend or terminate "though the exercise
of the power was restricted to a particular time which had not arrived, or
the happening of a particular event which had not occurred, at decedent's
death." "9 Although this interpretation may be justifiable in the case of a
reserved power in order to forestall avoidance by one who originally en-
joys full ownership, -0° wise tax administration should be opposed to a simi-
lar position where a power created by another person is still contingent at
the date of the donee's death. If, for example, a power is exercisable by
the donee after he attains a specified age and he dies at an earlier age, no
tax should be imposed because control over the property has failed to
materialize. Similar immunity seems warranted where the power fails to
ripen as a result of the donee's failure to survive another person. Again.
a donee may be authorized to appoint property if he dies without issue
surviving, and the property should not be taxable if the decedent is sur-
vived by issue. In these cases, the situation is analogous to that of the
16. See H. R. R1-. No. 704, 73d Cong., 24 Sess. (1934) 35 (1939-1 Ccmx. But..
Pt. 2, p. 581) ; SEx. RzP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 44-45 (1939-1 Cux. Bua.
Pt. 2, p. 620).
17. Section 811 (f) (3) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (1). Cf. Melkn v. Drisc~Al,
117 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), cert. dcnicd, 313 U. S. 579 (1941); Cubnial
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; Katherine B. Albrecht,
27 B. T. A. 1091 (1933).
18. But cf. Mr. Justice Cardozo's approach in Burnet Y. Guggenheim, 2,2S U. S. 2,9,
286 (1933).
19. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.20(b) (3). Cf. H. R. RP. No. 2.318, 74th O.ng.,
2d Sess. (1936) 10; G. C. M,. 11034, XII-2 Culu. BuL 271.
20. But see Day v. Commissioner, 92 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 3d, 137) ; Tait v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 74 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935); Estate of
Edward Lothrop Ballard, 47 B. T. A. 784 (1942); Mary Tetzlaff, C. C. H. 1943
T. C. Serv. ff 12,941-B (T. Ct. mere.); dissenting opinion in Estate of John Hovard
Helfrich, 1 T. C. 590, 594 (1943). And cf. Commissioner v. Flanders, I1l F. (2d) 117
(C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; Estate of James W. Henry, 2 C. C. H. 1942 T. C. Serv. f' 12,936-G
(T. Ct. mem.). See discussion in 1 PAu., op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 7.10, 17.16. $~
also Estate of Mabel Shaw Birkbeck, 47 B. T. A. '03 (1942), which dues nut deserve
to survive in view of United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363 (1939). It seems to Lu
assumed in Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U. S. 184 (1943), that a contingent p%,,uer
renders trust property taxable under section 811 (c) of the Code, by virtue of Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940). Cf. Estate of Peter D. Middlekauff, 2 T. C No. 27
(1943).
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contingent remainderman whose death simply obliterates his interest,
leaving nothing for the tax collector.2 '
The question raised by powers not exercisable at death may be ap-
proached from another direction. Property is taxable at death even though
its owner is unable, because of infancy or some other legal incapacity,
to transmit it by testamentary disposition. It is therefore arguable that
since a donee is treated as outright owner for tax purposes, property sub-
ject to a power should similarly be included in the donee's gross estate even
though he cannot exercise the power at death. Thus if a donee died before
reaching majority and before acquiring legal capacity to exercise the
power,2" the appointive property would be treated as a taxable asset. This
situation might be distinguished from one where the power, for example,
is exercisable if the donee survives another person. In the former case the
decedent's lack of effective power over the property results from a rule
of local law; if the donee resided in another jurisdiction he might very
well be considered competent to exercise the power. But in the latter case
there is no effective power, regardless of local rules, until the necessary
contingency occurs. Obviously the line between these cases is exceedingly
thin.2" A power to appoint property if the donee attains the age of twen-
21. See Commissioner v. Rosser, 64 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933); -lamlin v.
United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 501 (1928); 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 4.09. Another
analogy is provided by the case of an insured who neither paid the premiums nor en-
joyed control over the policy prior to or at death, where his estate was entitled to the
proceeds if he survived the beneficiary but the sequence of death was reversed, Cf.
Bailey v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 778 (Ct. Cl. 1940), cert. disissed on stipulation,
311 U. S. 721 (1940), overruled by Pub. L. No. 753, § 404(a).
These examples are not to be confused with a power exercisable at death where the
enjoyment of the appointive interest must await the termination of a precedent interest.
Thus A may have a power to appoint property subject to an outstanding life estate in B.
If A dies prior to B the value of the remainder is includible in the former's gross estate,
after due allowance for B's life estate. Cf. Camden Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 30 B. T.
A. 287 (1934), where the life tenant had a power to invade corpus in the event the in-
come was not sufficient to maintain her "in the way she is accustomed to live." The
Board held that these words created a standard "capable of being stated in definite terms
of money." Cf. further Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929) ; Estate
of Sarah A. Bergan, 1 T. C. 543 (1943).
22. This example is similar to the facts in Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co.,
316 U. S. 56 (1942). Cf. Estate of Barbey, N. Y. L. J., Oct. 19, 1942, p. 1089, col. 3
(Surr. Ct.). In Great Britain a general power is taxable although the donee is not sid
juris at death. See DYMOND, DEATH DuTEs (1942) 8. Cf. SUGDEN, PowERs (8th cd.
1861) 177.
23. The line is uncomfortably akin to that drawn, for income tax purposes, between
a present right in the settlor to revoke a trust, the revocation being effective at a speci-
fied future date unless the settlor dies in the interim, and a power which is contingent
upon the occurrence of a specified event. Compare Reuter v. Commissioner, 118 F.
(2d) 698 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941) ; Helvering v. Dunning, 118 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 4th,
1941), with Corning v. Commissioner, 104 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 6th, 1939); Com-
missioner v. Betts, 123 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941). See also the excellent dis-
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ty-one would not be taxable in the event that the donee died at an earlier
age; but a power would be taxable if no conditions were imposed by the
donor and the donee died while he was unable to exercise the power be-
cause of infancy. In both instances the donee is equally unable to affect
the devolution of the property. 4 Yet in other cases the distinction may
be quite substantial. For example, an aged donee who has failed to exer-
cise his power for many years when the opportunity readily presented
itself, may become mentally incompetent to execute a will shortly before
his death. A case along such lines does not seem to deserve the treat-
ment accorded a contingent interest which has never materialized. Per-
haps taxability in the case of one unable to exercise his power at death
will ultimately depend to a great extent upon whether the donee was ever
able to exercise the power.
Section 811 (f) (1) (B) and (C) imposes tax with respect to powers of
appointment exercised or released by a disposition in contemplation of
death, or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death, or retaining for the decedent control or enjoyment of the property
or income during his lifetime. These provisions regarding inter vivos
transfers conform generally to the related provisions of the old statute.
There are two differences: the new statute, unlike the old, extends to a
release, as well as an exercise, by the decedent during his lifetime; 2 and
the new statute refers to a "disposition" intended to take effect at death
in lieu of a "deed" to this effect. The term "disposition" seems more ad-
visable from a tax standpoint since "deed" may receive a cramped inter-
senting opinion of Mr. Opper in Henry A. B. Dunning, 41 B. T. A. 1101, 110 (1940),
rez'd, 118 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941); Ray, The Income Tax on Shorl Tcrm a:d
Revocable Trusts (1940) 53 HAnv. L. REV. 1322, 1334. The Coning decision has been
considered overruled. Altmaier v. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 162, 165 (C. C. A. 6th,
1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 706 (1940). Cf. First National Bank v. Commissicner,
110 F. (2d) 448. 450 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940). But cf. Commissioner v. O'Keeffe, 118 F.
(2d) 639, 642 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941). "... the fact that a line has to he drawn some-
where does not justify its being drawn anywhere." Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Pearce
v. Commissioner, 315 U. S. 543, 558 (1942).
24. Pub. L. No. 753, § 403(d) (3) provides that if a donee of a power created on or
before the date of enactment of the 1942 Act (October 21, 1942) and exercisable in favor
of the donee, his estate, his creditors, or creditors of his estate, is under a legal disability
on such date to release the power and dies while under such disability or within 6 months
after it ceases, the power is not taxable if it has not been e-xercised. See U. S. Trea&.
Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (3). There is no necessary inference here that the drafters assumcd
that the power must be exercisable at death in order to entail tax liability. The pur-
pose of the provision is to exempt from estate tax persons unable to relinquish their
powers within the grace period afforded by Congress. As a matter of fact, there may
be an implication here that a legal disability to exercise a power would not prevent the
imposition of estate tax since the same disability generally affects both an exercise and
a release, [cf. 3 RESTATE MENT, PRoPERTY (1940) § 3451, and such disability would appar-
ently not bar the levy in the absence of legislative intervention.
25. Compare § 811(d) (4); U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.21.
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pretation as a result of its property background."0 The operation of these
provisions may be illustrated by the following instance: A life tenant of
trust property over which he has a power of appointment within the
meaning of the statute, relinquishes the power and, in effect, appoints the
remainders. At the life tenant's death the trust property is includible in
his gross estate. Another example is afforded by the case of a donee
who exercises an otherwise taxable power by creating a trust and reserv-
ing a power of revocation.2' Moreover, a release during lifetime need not
be formal in character. Thus a power may be exercisable for a period of
twenty years after its creation, and the donee may permit the power to
lapse without expressly surrendering it. In effect the donee has relin-
quished his power, and its lapse is taxable if it is attributable to contem-
plation of death or has the required economic effect. 29 If the decedent-
donee has a life estate in addition to the power, the failure to exercise it
within the time stipulated renders the property taxable at death because
he has retained a life interest."0 The same is true if another person has
the life estate, where, for example, the donee succeeds to the remainder
if the taker gaining by the release predeceases him. 1
26. Compare Finance Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vscr., c. 30, § 22(2) (a). The word "dis-
position" would also take care of the unusual case of an "oral" release or exercise, assum-
ing it were possible under local law.
27. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (1).
28. Compare Carrie L. Jones, 41 B. T. A. 1279 (1940), decided under the former
statute.
29. "A release of a power of appointment need not be express or formal in charac-
ter. For example, the failure to exercise a power of appointment within a specified time,
resulting in the termination of the power of appointment, is taxable if other conditions
imposed by section 811 (f) (1) are present." H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess,
(1942) 161; SEN;. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 233. See also U. S. Treas.
Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (1). Cf. Allen v. Commissioner, 108 F. (2d) 961 (C. C. A. 3d,
1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 680 (1940) ; 2 PAUL, op. Cit. .supra note 7, § 16.04.
30. The incorporation of language taxing a release or exercise of a power where the
donee retains a life estate does not involve legislative approval of May v. Heiner, 281
U. S. 238 (1930), and Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938). Hence there is no implied
attack on the reasoning of Estate of Mary H. Hughes, 44 B. T. A. 1196 (1941), which
considers those decisions repudiated by Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 7.15. The specific language is obviously a practical
measure in view of the present state of confusion. The Board, however, has abandoned
its decision in the Hughes case and returned to May v. Heiner. Estate of Edward E.
Bradley, 1 T. C. 519 (1943). See also United States v. Brown, 134 F. (2d) 372 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1943); Brewer v. Hassett, C. C. H. Fed. Inh. Tax Serv. 1 10,032 (D. Mass,
1943); Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothenses, C. C. H. Fed. Inh. Tax Serv.
10,025 (E. D. Pa. 1943); Blunt v. Kelly, 41 F. Supp. 721 (D. N. J. 1941), aff'd,
131 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942). Cf. Welch v. Terhune, 126 F. (2d) 695, 699
(C. C. A. 1st, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 644 (1942); Commissioner v. Bridgeport
City Trust Co., 124 F. (2d) 48, 50 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 672
(1942).
31. Compare Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940); Klein v. United States,
283 U. S. 231 (1931). The regulations, U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (1), state that
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A tax occasioned by the release or nonexercise at death of a power of
appointment invites a new kind of problem which was nonexistent under
the former estate tax statute. Powers of appointment may be renounced
or disclaimed, the intended donee refusing to accept any appointive author-
ity. Generally speaking, property cannot be forced upon an unwilling
beneficiary3 2 and the same principle is equally relevant where a power
of appointment is bestowed upon another.33 Given this legal base, it is
not too difficult to visualize the construction of ingenious arguments
against taxability. If the donee dies without having exercised the power,
the executor may offer the convenient defense that the donee had no power
at death since he had previously rejected it. Clearly the effect of a
rejection of a power may be the economic equivalent of a release of an
accepted power. If A is bequeathed a life estate in conjunction with
a power of appointment, and B is the taker in default, a release of the
power will indefeasibly vest B's interest. B is similarly blessed if A
rejects the power and it consequently collapses. There is every incentive
now to claim that a power was rejected, since one may reasonably assume
that the statute does not attempt to tax a rejection of a power if it
does not reach a rejection of an outright gift.34
if a donee exercises his power by appointing the remainder to his wife if she survives
him, otherwise to his estate, the value of the appointed property is includible in his gross
estate. This statement assumes that the power is exercisable by deed.
32. See Strom v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556, 164 Pac. 1100 (1917); Albany Hospital v.
Albany Guardian Society, 214 N. Y. 435, 108 N. E. 812 (1915); Bradford v. Leake,
124 Tenn. 312, 137 S. V. 96 (1911) ; Bacon v. Barber, 110 Vt. 2S0, 6 A. (2d) 9 (1939) ;
see Comment [1938] Vis. L. REv. 632. Cf. 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusTrs (1935)
§§ 150, 173. A renunciation is generally deemed valid as against the creditors of the
intended beneficiary. Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa 658, 239 N. IV. 564 (1931); Fun-e
v. Grulke, 204 Iowa 314, 213 N. W. 608 (1927) ; Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa 474,
187 N. V. 20 (1922) ; Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53, 109 S. NV. 502 (1903). But
cf. Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal. (2d) 807, 108 P. (2d) 401 (1940). See discussion in Comment
(1938) 47 YALE L. J. 487, 488; (1930) 18 CALiF. L. REv. 298; (1939) 37 Mici. L.
REv. 1168.
33. Christian v. XVilson's Ex'rs, 153 Va. 614, 151 S. E. 300 (1930), ccrt. denicd, 282
U. S. 840 (1930). This assumption underlies section 408 of the 1942 Act, amending sec-
tions 812(d) and 861(a) (3) of the Code to allow a deduction for an amount falling into
a bequest to charity "as a result of an irrevocable disclaimer" of a power "if the dis-
claimer is made prior to the date prescribed for the filing of the estate tax return." See
H. R. Rx. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 166; Smz. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942) 240. Cf. Davison v. Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
An analogous income tax problem is raised by a renunciation, in contrast to an
assignment, of earned compensation. Compare Commissioner v. Giannini, 129 F. (2d)
638 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942), 56 HARv. L. REv. 313, with Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111 (1930) ;
Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940). See Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154,
168 (1942).
34. A renunciation of a legacy cannot be taxed as a transfer in contemplation of
death. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F. (2d) 914 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933), cert. desied, 290 U. S.
641 (1933), 33 COL. L. REv. 1269. This is an extreme case on its facts. Cf. Estate of
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The imminence of this problem is fully revealed by a statute recently
enacted in Massachusetts in response to the federal tax amendments.86
It is provided that a donee of a power "may disclaim the same at any
time, wholly or in part, in the same manner and to the same extent
as he might release it." There seems to be an obvious attempt here to
circumvent the federal statute via the route of disclaimer in lieu of
release. All one has to do apparently is to use the magic term "disclaim"
and Massachusetts will consider the power as rejected. Federal tax law,
however, need not bow abjectly before such local manipulating of
property concepts. Since the policy of the federal statute to tax releases
is intended to operate on a nationwide basis with fairly uniform effects
regardless of local variations, there is implicit in the statute a uniform
federal rule for delineating the differences between a release and a dis-
claimer.3 6 Otherwise, the statute may be conveniently destroyed by state
legislation. In determining whether a power was accepted or rejected
for tax purposes, the federal courts may summon to their aid the
various criteria which are normally employed in common law juris-
dictions.3" Various factors come into play, such as the time elapsing
between the creation of the power and its alleged rejection, and the
quality of the acts supposedly indicating a renunciation." The Gov-
Sarah A. Bergan, 1 T. C. 543 (1943). In the case of a renunciation the property has
been treated for succession tax purposes as if the rejected bequest had never been in-
cluded in the will. People v. Flanagin, 331 Ill. 203, 162 N. E. 848 (1928); Matter of
Merritt, 155 App. Div. 228, 140 N. Y. Supp. 13 (1st Dep't 1913); Matter of Wolfe, 89
App. Div. 349, 85 N. Y. Supp. 949 (2d Dep't 1903), aff'd, 179 N. Y. 599, 72 N. E. 1152
(1904) ; Matter of Clarkson, 137 Misc. 741, 244 N. Y. Supp. 470 (Surr. Ct. 1930) ; cf.
Matter of Cook, 187 N. Y. 253, 79 N. E. 991 (1907). The same question of rejection
versus release may arise under the gift tax amendment discussed infra at 534.
35. Mass. Laws 1943, c. 152. See also Ill. Laws 1943, p. 59.
36. Compare United States v. Pelzer, 312 U. S. 399 (1941); Commissioner v.
Morgan, 309 U. S. 78 (1940); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932). Consider
further the rule expressly sanctioned in section 408 of the 1942 Act. See note 33, supra.
A federal statute, however, reflects its own independent policy, even though Congress
has failed to particularize all the facets of such policy. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U. S. 363 (1943) ; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317
U. S. 173 (1942); D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. F. D. I. C., 315 U. S. 442 (1942);
Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U. S. 190 (1940); Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 308
U. S. 343 (1939).
37. See D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. F. D. I. C., 315 U. S. 447, 472 (1942). Although
a federal court may find persuasive materials in local law in fashioning federal policy
[cf. Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U. S. 289 (1941)], it should certainly
refuse "to play the role of ventriloquist's dummy" [cf. Richardson v. Commissioner,
126 F. (2d) 562, 567 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942)] to state legislation designed to facilitate the
avoidance of tax by distorting concepts and grossly misusing legal nomenclature. Cf.
United States v. Cambridge Loan & Building Co., 278 U. S. 55, 59 (1928).
38. See discussion in Note (1939) 123 A. L. R. 261. Cf. Camelia I. H. Cerf,
1 T. C. No. 145 (1943).
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eminent may call to its aid the general presumption that a beneficial be-
quest or gift is presumed to be accepted. There is no reason to confine
this principle to powers to appoint to the donee or his estate, for influence
and control over wealth and the conduct of others may be as robust where
the power is narrower in scope. Even if the power is considered a burden
rather than a benefit, it may be deemed a burden inseparably connected
with an interest in the appointive property given to the donee, and the
one gift must either be accepted or rejected in its entirety." If the power
is created by an inter vivos transfer, with the knowledge of the donee, the
claim of renunciation should be entirely foreclosed barring unusual cir-
cumstances.
Exempt Powers
Two powers to appoint property are not considered powers of appoint-
ment within the scope of the tax. The first is a power whose appointive
class does not include persons other than the spouse of the creator of the
power, the descendants (other than the donee-decedent) of the creator
or of his spouse, spouses of such descendants, the spouse of the decedent-
donee of the power, descendants of the donee or of his spouse, spouses
of such descendants,4" and beneficiaries within the deduction for charitable
bequests.41 The other is "a power to appoint within a restricted class" if
the decedent-donee did not receive any beneficial interest, vested or con-
tingent, in the appointive property from the creator of the power or
thereafter acquire any such interest, "and if the power is not exercisable
39. See Note (1934) 91 A. L. R. 607. Compare the principle that a trustee cannot
accept a trust in part and disclaim it in part 1 RSTArE!IENT, TrtsTs (1935) § 102(4).
One may as well recognize that since this question is comparatively novel, the federal
courts would be hardly confined in selecting an appropriate rationale for decision.
Furthermore, since the context of a case and the objectives of the parties concerned
may have a substantial effect on the result reached, the presence of a tax avoidance
element may induce the court to hold that requirements of a renunciation have not been
obeyed although another context would have inspired a contrary conclusion. Cf. Coon,
THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICr OF LAws (1942) passim; Hess and
Guterman, Annuity Trusts and the Fedcral Income Tax (1942) 55 Htny. L. R v. 329,
335.
40. The statute carefully provides that "descendant" ihcludes "adopted and illegiti-
mate descendants," and that "spouse" includes "former spouse." The Senate report adds:
"The treatment of adopted and illegitimate descendants as descendants is intended to
include adopted and illegitimate children (and their descendants and their adopted and
illegitimate children) as descendants, if such children would be descendants had they
been born as natural legitimate children in the station to which they are adopted or
born." SEN. R e. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 233. See also U. S. Treas. Reg.
105, § 81.24(b) (2). Once an adoption by a donee takes place, the issue of the adopted
person are drawn into the class composing the donee's descendants. See, further, Hear-
ings before Committee on Finance on H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 113.
41. Sections 812(d), 861(a) (3).
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to any extent for the benefit of the decedent, his estate, his creditors,
or the creditors of his estate."
If the first exception made by the statute is viewed in isolation, it seems
to be completely at war with the underlying desire to close loopholes. The
power of appointment is a mechanism for maintaining control over the
donee's intimate family group, for the conduct of others is regulated by
the ability to punish or reward. Even if the suspended blessings are re-
served exclusively for members of the donee's family, he nevertheless
enjoys a nice little bundle of control. 2 One who owns property outright
does not, practically speaking, exert much more control since his power
to regulate is similarly exercised through the transmission of property
within the family group. Hence the powers which the statute places be-
yond the reach of the tax seem to be the very powers which should be
taxed. Another route leads to the same destination. A donee whose ap-
pointive discretion is restricted to the family group enjoys the essential
benefits of the broadest general power, namely, the ability to provide for
his family and the assurance that the means are at hand .4  The persons
falling within the appointive class are normally those who would enjoy
the fruits of his generosity even if his discretion were unconfined." He
may, in fact, be considered more fortunate than the donee of a general
power since the property is beyond the reach of creditors.46
A competing principle, however, apparently comes into play. As the
estate tax statute now stands, there is no tax upon the death of the life
tenant and the final ripening of the remainder. In short, there is but one
tax upon a life estate-remainder sequence, imposed at the death of the
person responsible for the sequence.4" As long as a life estate and a re-
mainder are subject to one tax levy, the same consequences should flow
from a life estate plus a narrow power to adjust the remainder in the light
of altered conditions. If all special powers were taxed, testators and
grantors would, in all probability, utilize the inflexible life estate-remain-
der plan of disposition, and forego the benefits of a special power. The
small revenue gains would not be worth the loss in flexibility if the power
42. "... the donor may also have intended to keep the children under the parents'
control where a parent is the donee of the power." Coffin v. Cooper, 2 Drew. & Stu.
365, 374 (Ch. 1865). Cf. Commissioner v. Buck, 120 F. (2d) 775, 777-78 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941).
43. Compare McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition versus Clarfication
and Reform (1942) 55 HARv. L. REV. 1077, 1112 (1942) ; Schuyler, Powers of Appoint-
ment and Especially Special Powers: The Estate Taxpayer's Last Stand (1939) 33 ILL.
L. REV. 771, 780.
44. Compare (1940) 40 COL. L. RE,. 923, 926.
45. See 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 326. Cf. Eisenstein, supra note 1, at 316.
46. Compare Mills, Transfers from Life Tenant to Renainderman in Relation to the
Federal Estate Tax (1941) 19 TAXES 195. But cf. DYmoND, op. cit. supra note 22, at 16,
for the English treatment.
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disappeared." An excepted class of powers should therefore be defined
in response to this consideration.
A delicate problem is involved, however, in locating the line separating
taxability from immunity."' For instance, the excepted class may be criti-
cized as too broad in view of the guiding policy consideration. The ordi-
nary examples of the life estate-remainder arrangement are a life estate
for one's spouse. with a remainder to one's issue, and a life estate to one's
children, with a remainder to their issue. The exempt class might there-
fore be confined, as in the House bill, 4  to the spouse of the decedent-
donee, the descendants of the donee or of his spouse, and the spouses of
such descendants."o In the Senate, however, this class was enlarged to
include the spouse of the creator of the power, descendants (other than
the decedent-donee) of the creator or of his spouse, and spouses of such
descendants. 1
The class also includes charitable objects in line with the general policy
to encourage gifts to charity.12 Even without a provision to this effect
47. Compare 1 P.A.UL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 479; Griswold, Pners of Appointment
and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52 H.mv. L. Ruv. 929. 958; Leach, Powers of Appoint-
i3knt and the Federal Estate Tax-A Dissent (1939) 52 HARV. L. REV. 961, 955, n. 2;
Lowndes, Tax Avoidance and the Federal Estate Tax (1940) 7 LAw & CO:TE.P. Pro,?.
309, 322; Paul, The Emergenc, Job of Federal Taxation (1941) 27 Corer. L Q. 3, 12.
48. The line may be drawn by taxing all powers, subject to a carefully defined ex-
ception, or by defining affirmatively the powers which are subject to tax. The former
method, reflected by the statute, is clearly superior, since it is practically imp.ssible to
achieve a satisfactory affirmative definition of all powers which should incur tax. But cf.
Leach, supra note 47, at 966. The definition would have to foresee all kinds of ingenious
contrivances, and powers functioning for purposes of avoidance might easily escape the
statutory net. It is comparatively simple to except those special powers which merit
immunity.
49. H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) §403(a). See also Statement of Ran-
dolph E. Paul, quoted supra at 494.
50. A statute which includes the donee's descendants in the excepted class of objects
may as well include their spouses in order to allow for the necessary flexibility. Cf. Gris-
wold, szpra note 47, at 960, suggesting a tax on special powers, but excepting "any
power which could be exercised only among the children of the donor or of the donee,
and when the property, in default of appointment, is to be distributed among the class:
See also 1 PAuL, op. cit. spra note 7, at 480.
51. Sax. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 233; Coxr. REP. No. 252',
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 69. The Senate report states: "The limitation excluding
the decedent from the excepted group of descendants of the creator of the power or his
spouse, is not intended to exclude from the excepted group the spouse of the decedent, who
is expressly included in the group. The description of these persons as an excepted class
is intended to be construed so as to give uniform Federal application:' See also U. S.
Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (2). The language of the regulation is broad enough to deny
the exemption if one of the favored relatives is also a creditor. It is extremely doubtful,
however, whether this interpretation was intended by the Treasury. Cf. Comment (1943)
43 Co. L. REv. 76, 78, n. 13.
52. See Y. A. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 50 (1924). The time seems tw be ripe
for a re-examination of this deduction. Compare the Treasury's propusal to limit the
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the decedent's estate would be entitled to a deduction for an appointment
to charity under section 812(d) or section 861 (a) (3) of the Code, as
amended by the 1942 Act."' The purpose of the provision is to assure
immunity where the assets are not appointed to charity, and therefore
are not taken out of the taxable estate as deductions. 4 A person inter-
ested in creating a tax-free power which embraces charitable recipients
should make certain that they satisfy the requirements of section 812(d)
or 861 (a) (3). If there is a defect on this score the immunity of the
power disappears."
It is important to note that taxability because of a power outstanding at
death depends upon the relationship of the appointive class at that moment.
Assume that the donee receives from his brother, who is childless, a power
to appoint property to the donee's children, who are also the takers in
default, or, if there are no children, to the children of another brother.
If the donee, at the date of death, has no children, the existence of the
other class of eligible appointees will render the power taxable, since the
persons within the latter class do not fall within the statutory exception.
The creator of the power may accomplish practically the same result with-
out concomitant tax liability by providing that the persons composing
the substituted class should take in specified shares in the event that the
donee has no children. At his death the donee has no power of appoint-
ment."0
The question may arise whether the takers in default should not be con-
sidered in determining whether the appointive class is sufficiently limited
for purposes of tax immunity. Certainly in a broad sense the takers in
default are within the donee's area of discretion, for by refraining from
charitable deduction, as summarized in Statement of Mr. Paul, supra note 1, at 91. See,
further, GRISWOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS Ox FEDERAL TAXATION (1940) 264; 1 PAUL,
op. cit. supra note 7, § 12.28; Harriss, Philanthropy and Federal Tax Exemption (1939)
47 J. Por- EcoN. 526.
53. Pub. L. No. 753, § 403(b) (1) and (2). Under the prior law it was not clear
whether an appointment to charity qualified as a deduction. See I PAUL, op. Cit. supra
note 7, at 421; Griswold, supra note 47, at 950. The committee reports on section
403(b) (1) and (2) of the 1942 Act state that it is "clarifying with respect to property
passing to charity under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent and
includible in his gross estate." H. R. RzP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 161;
SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 233.
54. See discussion at p. 525 infra.
55. The power may still be exempt if appropriately confined to a restricted class.
See p. 509 infra.
56. It may be possible, depending largely upon the language creating the power, to
avoid estate tax by means of an adoption. Suppose A has a testamentary power to appoint
to his issue and, if no issue survive him, a general power of appointment. If the donee
has no natural issue, he may adopt his appointee and thereby retain his exempt special
power. Local law will determine whether a power to appoint among issue includes
adopted children.
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exercise or by releasing the power the appointive property may be directed
to persons without the exempt class. But the statute apparently confines
its interest to those persons whom the donee may affirmatively designate
as the recipients of the property, as distinguished from those who benefit
by the donee's inactivity. T It seems fairly safe to assume therefore that
the exempt character of the appointive class is not affected by the rela-
tionship of any of the takers in default,"5 especially since a power is gen-
erally regarded as an authority to determine the relative interests in prop-
erty,5' whereas the respective shares in the unappointed property are set-
fled by the creator of the power, and cannot be reallocated by the doneeO
The second statutory exception, according immunity to "a power
possessed by a disinterested trustee or one occupying a similar status to
appoint within a relatively small class," "' is the so-called "fiduciary
power" referred to in M'Xr. Paul's statement before the Vays and Means
Committee. 12 A power falling within this exception should, in most cases,
57. This conclusion does not contradict the earlier assertion that economically the
nonexercise of a power is one way of exercising it. See Eisenstein, supra note 1, at 393.
As already indicated, the statute seems to except certain powers because of the favored
status accorded the life estate-remainder sequence. Since the possible appointees might
have been designated as the recipients of the property without any power hanging over
their interests as a sword of Damocles, other takers in default become relatively unimport-
ant, as the designation of remoter kin is a reasonable contingent disposition in the event
that closer kin are not present to receive the property. But compare Professor Griswold's
suggestion, supra note 50.
58. Compare 3 RESTATEmENr, PRzomn (1940) §310. Discretion is not absolute
in the case of a non-exclusive power. Id. §§ 360, 361.
59. A donee might be required to appoint to certain persons in specifically stated
proportions or permit the property to pass by default in other stated proportions to
another group of persons which is not identical with the former class. But this type of
power is a rara azis and does not satisfy the needs of flexibility to which a pawer of
appointment traditionally responds.
60. Again, one may note the possibility of unusual arrangements for the devolution
of property. The donee might have a power to appoint within the excepted group of
relatives specified by section 311(f) (2) (A), his estate being the taker in default. Actu-
ally, however, the donee in this case has a taxable power since he may allocate the various
portions among persons without the class specified in the above section. But cf. Comment
(1943) 56 H~Av. L. Ray. 428, 454. The donee's estate might become entitled to a share
in default of appointment because of the death of a person originally designated by the
donor as a taker in default. Cf. DYMIOND, op. cit. supra note 22, at S.
61. H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 161; SE.. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 233.
62. See SE.N. RaP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 55. Cf. Finance Act, 2894,
57 & 58 VicT., c. 30, § 22(2) (a), exempting "fiduciary powers" from death tax imlpsed
with respect to general powers. See Ganax, Dr.Tn Dursas (1936) 48. Instead of em-
ploying the term "fiduciary" and leaving the details to the courts, section 811(f) (2) (B)
contains a detailed description of the power which it is desired to exempt. This tech-
nique avoids the ambiguities lurking in "fiduciary." See Palmer v. Locke, 15 Ch. 294,
302 (1879). Cf. Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate, and Gift
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enjoy immunity by virtue of the first exception based on relationship.
The purpose of the second exception is to extend immunity to cases where
the power is essentially a burden and similarly confined to a comparatively
small group.13 Here again there is a concession to the needs of flexibility.
The committee reports carefully indicate the meaning of "restricted class":
"For example, a power to appoint within a class composed of A's chil-
dren would be a power to appoint within a restricted class. On the other
hand, a power to appoint to anyone except A and his family would not
be a power confined to a restricted class." 64 The term "class" has no
technical property connotation, as, for example, a group of takers in-
tended to fluctuate in number."5 It is simply a question of the number of
persons eligible as appointees at the taxable moment.6 Of course, one
may, without undue strain, imagine cases where it would be difficult to
determine whether the appointive group qualifies as a restricted class,"
but a person who really desires to create a "fiduciary power" is sufficiently
protected by the statutory language.
There is another requirement, aside from the restricted character of
the class, to be satisfied. The donee must "not receive any beneficial in-
terest, vested or contingent, in the property from the creator of the power
or thereafter acquire any such interest," and the power must not be "exer-
Tax Provisions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers (1942) 56 IHAn. L. R~v.
337, 345-46.
63. Compare 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 413: "A power of appointment may
be more in the nature of a trust or even a power of attorney, leaving the donee with no
beneficial rights of his own and merely burdening him with responsibility and onerous
duties, as in a case in which the donor devises property for the benefit of his children,
vesting in a trusted friend the power to distribute the property among the children by
his last will in the manner he deems most in keeping with the presumable intent of the
donor."
64. See SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 233; H. R. REP. No. 2333,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 161 (with a slight variation in language). The Senate report
adds: "Moreover, a power to appoint is not confined to a restricted class because the
power is not exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors
of his estate, or all of them."
65. See 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) §279; Cooley, What Constitutes a Gift
to a Class (1936) 49 HAIv. L. REv. 903.
66. When the power is created the number of possible appointees may exceed the
bounds of "restricted." At the donee's death, however, the number of eligibles may be
so reduced through death or other causes as to render the power exempt.
67. Compare 3 RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 320, stating that in order to qualify
as special, a power must be exercisable "only in favor of persons, not including the
donee, who constitute a group not unreasonably large." This statement is amplified by
comment d, which declares that a power to appoint to the relatives of A is not a power
to appoint to a group unreasonably large even if "relatives" includes all blood relatives.
"This, however, is about the limit of permissible breadth. Powers to appoint to the friends
or acquaintances of the donor, or to any person except the donee or his spouse, or to any
resident of Massachusetts are examples of group descriptions too broad to create a
special power as here defined."
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cisable to any extent for the benefit of the decedent, his estate, his
creditors, or the creditors of his estate." This condition is in line with
the purpose of the exemption, and aids in delineating the nature of the
power qualifying for immunity. The exemption is lost if at any time
after the creation of the power the donee acquires any beneficial interest
in the property, even if not directly from the creator of the power. And
it makes no difference if the beneficial interest is contingent or remote.P
Indeed it would be difficult to trace a line of demarcation in terms of
"vested" or "contingent", since a contingent remainder may be extremely
valuable; nor would it be simpler to make distinctions in the light
of remoteness and propinquity, for there is no workable yardstick
which would lend itself easily to a proper interpretation of "legis-
lative" intention. 9 However, despite the breadth of the provision, a
few qualifications seem to be required if a fair and reasonable adminis-
tration is to be achieved. Thus a trustee's commission payable out of
the appointive property 70 should not per se have any adverse effect;
otherwise the exemption would be deprived of any practical value.
But if the donor provides for a commission, payable out of the property,
which is in excess of the customary allowance under local law, it
might be held that the proscribed beneficial interest exists. Again, the
mere fact that the donee has some beneficial interest in the property
should not destroy the exemption, if the interest is commensurate with
the donee's services and requires the performance of such services."1 The
donee may still be considered "disinterested" whether or not he is a trus-
tee. Finally, the statute does not withdraw immunity merely because the
donee receives other property, not included in the appointive assets, from
the creator of the power. '2
68. Compare Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, C. C. H. Fed. Inh.
Tax Serv. 10,025 (E. D. Pa. 1943); Estate of Horatio Gates Lloyd, 47 B. T. A. 349
(1942) ; John E. Cain, Sr., 43 B. T. A. 1133 (1941). But cf. Commissioner v. Kellogg,
119 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); Estate of Charles Delany, 1 T. C. 781 (1943).
Once the donee acquires the forbidden property interest, the damage is apparently done.
The statute withdraws the benefit of the exemption even if the interest is released. The
remedy of a donee who desires to stay within the exemption is to reject the property
interest.
69. Compare 1 PAUL, op. cit. mspra note 7, at § 7.28.
70. Compare Commissioner v. Davis, 132 F. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 1st, 1943).
71. Compare United States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179 (1923) ; Bank of New York
v. Helvering, 132 F. (2d) 773 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), with Ream Y. Bov-ers, ". F. (2d)
465 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) ; Rose v. Grant, 39 F. (2d) 338 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), dimnissed
on vwtion of petitioner, 283 U. S. 867 (1931). See 1 MmzTE: s, LAW OF FEDaZL INconiII
TAXAT ON (1942) § 6.04. The policy seems to be to divorce the holder of the property
from any beneficial interest as such in the property.
72. It has been suggested that in order to lose the exemption the donee must not
have any interest in the rights subject to the power and not simply in the res. Thus a
power of appointment over the remainder, held by a life tenant, could qualify as a "fidu-
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The "fiduciary power" excepted by the statute calls for a thorough
overhauling of trust mores. It is not unusual for a settlor to bestow
powers of revocation and amendment upon one or more trustees,U in
whom he has complete confidence on the basis of such factors as rela-
tionship, 4 business association, or intimate friendship. This authority
vested in the trustees is, in legal effect, a power of appointment not con-
fined to a restricted class or to the exempt class of relatives,75 even though
ciary" power. See Comment (1943) 43 COL. L. Rav. 76, 78. But this construction, which
is obviously not borne out by the statutory language, would obviously undermine the
first exception, carefully based on relationship, by extending the exemption to practically
all special powers. Only in comparatively rare cases does the donee of a special power
have an interest in the rights which may be appointed.
73. The estate tax consequences at the settlor's demise are not clear at the present
time. Compare Blunt v. Kelly, 131 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942) ; Brewer v. Hassett,
C. C. H. Fed. Inh. Tax Serv. 1 10,023 (D. Mass. 1943) ; Chase National Bank v. Higgins,
38 F. Supp. 858 (S. D. N. Y. 1941), with Helvering v. St, Louis Union Trust Co.,
296 U. S. 39 (1935), overruled in another connection by Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S.
106 (1940); Billings v. United States, 24 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 1161 (S. D. Cal, 1939);
Anna B. Kneeland, 34 B. T. A. 816 (1936). See Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F.
(2d) 237, 239 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 658 (1942) ; Herzog v.
Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 591, 595 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). In so far as the gift tax
is concerned, it seems clear enough that a trust reserving appointive control in the
trustees is subject to gift tax. Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F. (2d) 237 (C. C, A.
1st, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 658 (1942) ; Albert D. Lasker, 1 T. C. 208 (1942) ;
cf. Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 591 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Rheinstrom v.
Commissioner, 105 F. (2d) 642 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); Estate of Ben F. Hazelton, Jr.,
C. C. H. 1940 B. T. A. Serv. 1 11,297-F (B.T.A. mem.). But cf. the contrary assump-
tion in Cockrell v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 148 (Ct. Cl. 1941). These questions are
considered in detail in 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 7.12, 17.11.
74. Compare, for example, the powers of the husband-trustee in Lillian M. New-
man, 1 T. C. 921 (1943), and of the wife-trustee in Estate of Edward Lothrop Ballard,
47 B. T. A. 784 (1942).
75. Here, again, federal taxation makes uncomfortable contact with local property
law. The language of a trust instrument may be very deceiving, for local law may read
ostensibly broad powers of disposition in grudging fashion. For example, in Helvering
v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942), the trustees, other than the settlor, were empowered
"to alter, change or amend this Indenture at any time and from time to time by changing
the beneficiary hereunder . . . or in any other respect." The circuit court of appeals
determined, on the basis of local law, that this language did not authorize the trustees
to convey the.property to the settlor. A majority of the Supreme Court acquiesced in
this conclusion although, as the dissenting Justices contended, there was no local deci-
sion holding or suggesting that the circuit court was right. The Stuart decision seems
to impose a serious limitation upon the presumption in favor of the Commissioner's deter-
mination. Cf. Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
The regulations state that "ordinarily, powers of management with respect to prop-
erty in trust, such as the determination of whether distributions shall be annually or
quarterly, the making of investments and reinvestments, or the determinations of items
of income and principal under recognized rules of accounting, are not powers of appoint-
ments over property under section 811(f)." U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (1). On
the other hand, one may have a power of appointment over income. Cf. Camelia I. H.
19431 POWERS OF APPOINTMENT AND ESTATE TAXES 513
intended to be exercised in accordance with the settlor's desires." Further-
more, even if the appointive group is "restricted," the power may still be
taxable because the trustee has received some interest in the trust property,
perhaps of an extremely remote character. All such powers must be sur-
rendered prior to March 1, 1944, or remain unexercised, depending upon
the scope of the power; otherwise they will be swept into the orbit of the
amendments." Despite this inroad upon trust practice, the statute repre-
sents a reasonable effort to sustain its policy considerations and, at the
same time, permit the continuance of a healthy flexibility in trust adminis-
tration.7' Settlors who desire to avail themselves of the services of others
may do so by narrowing the scope of appointive discretion within the
limits delineated by the statute, and complying with other requirements
of immunity. More attention must be devoted to tax consequences, but
increased vigilance is a small price to pay for tax immunity.
Since the "fiduciary power" is not dependent upon the relationship of
the appointive class, it seems clear enough that immunity is not lost if
charities are included in the class. One may proceed one step further,
as the regulations " do: There is no limit upon the number of charities
which may be included in the class as long as they all satisfy the require-
ments of section 812(d) or 861 (a) (3). All such charities should be
regarded as one object in view of the desire to encourage gifts for chari-
Cerf, 1 T. C. No. 145 (1943). Thus A may create a trust for the life of B, authorizing
C to appoint the income to any persons other than C, his estate, or creditors. At Cs
death the income subject to his power of disposition should be included in his gross
estate. Cf. Commissioner v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 124 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941), cert. denied, 316 U. S. 672 (1942) ; Estate of Edward Lothrop Ballard, 47 B.T. A.
784 (1942).
76. See also p. 516 infra, discussing powers exercisable jointly by the grantor and the
trustee.
77. See p. 542 infra.
78. Mr. Colin F. Stain, Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation, has observed: "It is believed that the present law may result in hardship upon
the fiduciary with a general power and require the property subject to the power to be
included in the trustee's own estate; although he had no personal interest in the prop-
erty and was never intended to have any such personal interest." SF..:. rEP. No. 1832,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 1. This criticism hardly does justice to the statute, which
carefully protects trustees. A person holding a general power does not deserve im-
munity regardless of his simultaneous enjoyment of the title of trustee. On the other
hand, if he desires to function as a "fiduciary" the statute permits him to do so without
any tax burden. The only hardship here seems to be a tax which there is no need to incur.
79. We have reached a point where tax incidence has become a crucial factor in
the development of property law. Perhaps it might be more correct to say that many
recent phases in the development of property law derive basically from a tax law which
continues to cut more deeply and widely. Many trust instruments, for e., mple, would
never be written if tax consequences did not intrude. The law of powers of appointment
is also stimulated by the search for freedom from tax.
80. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (2).
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table purposes. But this policy consideration is not applicable if the re-
cipients do not meet the conditions of the estate tax statute. In that case
each should be regarded as a separate object in determining whether the
class is restricted. A careful appraisal of the charities placed in the ap-
pointive group is therefore in order. However, even if tle power is
taxable, the property may escape tax by the deduction route if the ap-
pointee or taker in default qualifies under either of the above sections,"
Powers E.xercisable it Conjunction with Another Person
Section 811 (f), as amended by the 1942 Act, provides that a power is
taxable whether exercisable by the decedent "alone or in conjunction with
any person." 82 An analogous provision in section 811(d), dealing with
reserved powers, has been sustained by the Supreme Court in Helvering v.
City Bank Farmers Trust Company. 3 The Court observed that section
811 (d) was intended to prevent avoidance of the estate tax "by the device
of joining with the grantor in the exercise of the power of revocation
someone who he believed would comply with his wishes. Congress may
well have thought that a beneficiary who was of the grantor's immediate
family might be amenable to persuasion or be induced to consent to a
revocation in consideration of other expected benefits from the grantor's
estate." Therefore, Congress could constitutionally provide that if a
grantor of a trust "saw fit to reserve to himself jointly with any other
person the power of revocation or alteration, the transaction should be
deemed to be testamentary in character; that is, treated for the purposes
of the law as intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the
death of the settlor." 84
The situation is not exactly the same, however, where a power exer-
cisable with the consent of another person has been bestowed upon the
decedent. Whereas a settlor, as master of the trust property, may join
with him one who is "amenable to persuasion," a similar opportunity is
not accorded the donee of a power. The choice is in the donor, who may
actually attempt to fetter the donee's discretion, rather than circumscribe
narrowly the class of potential appointees. In view of the difference in
context between a power falling within section 811 (d) and a power of
appointment, it may be argued that an exception should be made for those
81. See p. 525 infra.
82. Section 811 (f) (2) of the Code.
83. 296 U. S. 85 (1935). Section 811(g) of the Code, as amended by Pub. L, No.
753, § 404, now contains a similar provision to the effect that insurance upon the life of
the decedent, payable to specific beneficiaries, is taxable where the decedent has at the
date of death "any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in con-
junction with any other person." This provision overcomes a number of decisions to
the contrary. See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 10.22.
84. 296 U. S. at 90, 92. Cf. Flood v. United States, 133 F. (2d) 173, 177 (C. C. A,
1st, 1943); Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d) 331, 335 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
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cases where the person whose consent is required maintains a real control
over the appointment." Experience, however, with the "substantial ad-
verse interest" concept in the income tax statute " indicates that a fac-
tual study of control in each case is impractical, engenders uncertainty
and invites litigation. 7 The best solution, in view of the avoidance possi-
bilities lurking in a formal veto power given to another, is a blanket pro-
vision including all powers otherwise taxable whose exercise is dependent
upon the consent of others. This provision, incorporated in the new stat-
ute. is reasonable for purposes of due process, s and any individual hard-
ships are outweighed by the closing of a loophole to avoidance. In
addition, this protective device does not in itself seriously hamper the use
of powers to achieve flexibility in family settlements. 9
A tax upon powers exercisable in conjunction with another person
does, however, present a problem which requires careful administration.
If two persons must agree upon the exercise of a power, how is the dunce
to be distinguished from the person whose consent is required for the
exercise ? " Or does the statute reflect a desire to consider either one as
the donee of the power and therefore subject to estate tax? In the
case of a joint power "' the persons concerned are commonly regarded
as equal participants in directing the devolution of the property, to be
85. Compare 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 9.11.
86. Sections 166, 167.
87. See PAUL. STUDIES In FEFDErAL TAx.TioN, Trum SERiEs (1940) 213; 2 PXuL,
op. cit. supra note 7, § 17.10; Ray, supra note 23, at 1324.
88. Compare Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78 (1940). In Rcdieck v. Helver-
ing, 87 F. (2d) 328 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), it was held that the decedent's will could be
regarded as a "generating source" of the transfer even though its prc visions might he
revised by others after his death.
89. Generally, it seems, one of the major purposes of a pr,)visi:m requiring the con-
sent of others is to keep the property within the family. Cf. Charles J. Hepburn, 37
B. T. A. 459 (1938).
90. This problem does not arise under section 811(d), taxing inter vivos transfers
where a power to revoke or alter, exercisable in conjunction with another, is reserved
to the transferor. The tax is imposed only upon the estate of the person who owned the
transferred property. Brown v. Commissioner, 119 F. (2d) 983 (C. C. A 7th, 1941) ;
Colonial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); see Com-
missioner v. Solomon, 124 F. (2d) 86, 89 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) ; cf. Lehman v. C-rmmis-
sioner, 109 F. (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 037 (1940) ; Estate
of Frederick S. Fish, 45 B. T. A. 120 (1941). Compare section 811(ce), providing that
property held jointly or by the entirety is taxable to the extent of the decedent's contri-
bution, and that if property so held is acquired by inheritance or bequest, one-half is
attributable to the tenant dying first. Pub. L. No. 753, § 402. changing the estate tax
status of community property, similarly taxes to the decedent the pr, pvrty attritjutabl!
to his or her economic efforts or separate property. However, in nko event is the value of
the included property less than the value of the property subjec(t t,3 the decedent's piwer
of testamentary disposition. See H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong.. 2d Sess. (19-M) I$);
SEX. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 231.
91. Compare Ryerson v. Commissioner, 312 U. S. 405 (1941).
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distinguished from the situation where one person is entrusted with the
necessary discretion, subject to the other's restraint. 2 Usually, it seems,
the donee of a power is the person upon whose death the exercise or gift
in default takes effect. Thus if A has a life estate preceding the appointive
remainder, and the concurrence of B is required in order to exercise the
power, the estate tax should not ordinarily attach at B's death even if the
power thereupon disappears. But the power may reside in persons who do
not enjoy any interest in the appointive assets, as, for example, three
trustees. If the power survives the death of each until the death of all
three, is there a tax upon the estate of each trustee -93 or is the tax sus-
pended until the death of the last surviving trustee, or is taxability deter-
mined by some factor other than the sequence of death or the effect of
death upon the power? Also, the problem may become acute when the
persons involved have substantial stakes in the property. For example,
income from property may be bequeathed to A and B for their joint lives,
with all the income payable to the survivor, in conjunction with a power
in A and B to be exercised jointly, or a power in the survivor if the power
remains unexercised.
The regulations 14 apparently approach the problem by way of the
specific factual pattern. Generalities are carefully rationed, thus indi-
cating a case-by-case process of inclusion and exclusion. It is provided
that if A transfers property in trust for the life of his son B, authorizing
him to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the trust with the consent of
the trustee, the entire property is includible in B's estate at his death. Fur-
thermore, if "the trustee is a disinterested third party not receiving any
beneficial interest upon such transfer," the trust property is not includible
in the trustee's estate in the event that he predeceases B. "Similarly, if
property is transferred in trust by a grantor reserving the power to alter,
amend, revoke or terminate the trust with the consent of the trustee who
is a disinterested party not receiving any beneficial interest upon the trans-
fer, the value of the property is not includible in such trustee's personal
estate if he should predecease the grantor." In short, the regulations
seem to take the position that a person is not taxed merely because his
concurrence is a prerequisite of a valid exercise of a power.
In the case of the life tenant who has a power exercisable with the
consent of the trustee, the latter's immunity is carefully hedged with the
assumption that he is "disinterested" and does not receive "any beneficial
interest" upon the transfer. There seem to be at least two implications
92. The Restatement makes a distinction but offers no assistance. It states briefly,
"A power may be created in two or more persons to be exercised by them jointly. A
power may be exercisable by the donee only with the assent of some other person." 3
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 318, comment f.
93. It is assumed that the trustee, if a donee, is not entitled to immunity.
94. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.24(b) (1).
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here. First, a trustee who has a beneficial interest in the property may be
treated as a donee. If the trustee were a taker in default whose interest
might be seriously affected by appointment, the property subject to the
power would apparently be included in his gross estate. It is not clear
whether the substantiality of the trustee's interest will be considered
significant. Although an insubstantial property interest may disqualify
a donee-trustee from immunity, there is no reason to ignore the nature
of his interest in determining whether he is a donee at all. Second, even
if the trustee has not received a beneficial interest in the property, he may
still be considered a taxable donee if he is not "disinterested." For exam-
ple, to take a very strong case from the Government's point of view, if the
trustee or his estate is an object of the power, his control over the devolu-
tion is sufficiently potent to regard him as a donee. The Treasury is thus
evolving a criterion which smacks a good deal of the substantial adverse
interest concept, " and is at the same time more potent. A person who has
a stake in the property, be it present or prospective, risks the tax burden
imposed upon a donee even though he is not given a power in so many
words." Instead of being treated as a restraining influence, lie is regard-
ed as a joint donee. Moreover, he may be a donee even though his interest
in the property would not be affected by the appointment.m  The regula-
tion permits the inference that a person is not necessarily "disinterested"
merely because he lacks a beneficial interest in the appointive property or
does not enjoy the possibility of "coming into a good thing." 0s A parental
interest in routing the property to one's children either as appointees or
as takers in default might be sufficient, although it does not per se qualify
as a substantial adverse interest."
The second example given by the regulations, relating to a power
shared by the grantor, also sets a similar implication at large, since the
same qualifications are made with respect to the trustee. But there is
another element present here, which may be exemplified by a trust creating
a life estate for the benefit of the grantor's wife, establishing a remainder
in their children, and reserving broad powers of revocation and modifica-
95. See note 87, supra.
96. It would be extremely unfortunate to hold that a person lacks a power of appoint-
ment because of the particular legal phraseology although the control enjoyed by him
is that of a donee. The fact that an instrument bestows a power upon A, exerc sable
with the consent of B, does not conclusively establish that only A is the dunee. The
crux of the matter should be B's relation to the property and its devolution, not the
legal phrasing. Cf. Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U. S. 435, 443 (1940).
97. Compare Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d) 331, 33tb (C. C. A. 1st, 1940);
G. C. M. 19113, 1937-2 Cur. Buu.. 151.
98. Compare Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d) 331, 336 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940)
99. See Loeb v. Commissioner, 113 F. (2d) 664 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), cert. de:ed,
311 U. S. 710 (1940); Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940);
cf. Commissioner v. Caspersen, 119 F. (2d) 94 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), cert. drcd, 314
U. S. 643 (1941).
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tion in the grantor and his spouse. If the grantor dies first the entire
property is taxable under section 811(d) of the Code.1 00 In estate tax
theory the settlor is the dominant party of the two, and the wife is merely
"another person" amenable to persuasion.' 0 ' It would therefore be some-
what incongruous to hold that if the wife dies first the trust property
should be included in her estate under section 811 (f). The same incon-
gruity would extend to the case of the trustee regardless of whether
he is disinterested. However, if the settlor's power terminates upon the
prior death of the person whose consent is required in order to exercise
the power, the trust property will escape estate tax unless it is included
in the latter's estate. 102
A related pattern is provided by the joint creation of a trust, revocable
or alterable upon the consent of all the settlors, where each settlor brings
property into the trust. In this case the decedent's taxable estate includes,
by virtue of section 811(d), the share of trust corpus attributable to the
decedent.'0 3 Here, also, the claim that the decedent is the donee of a power
and therefore the entire trust property is includible in his gross estate seems
to violate the principle underlying section 811 (d) imposing tax upon the
co-settlors. But if the trust becomes irrevocable upon the death of one
of two settlors, the portion of trust property allocable to the survivor's
transfer will escape estate tax unless all the trust property is included in
the first decedent's gross estate.' 0 4 In that event it may seem desirable to
100. This section includes in the decedent's gross estate property transferred by him
"by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death
to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by
the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other person . . . to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate .... ." See Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co.,
296 U. S. 85 (1935). But cf. Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93 (1935).
101. 296 U. S. at 90, 92. But cf. Estate of Edward Lothrop Ballard, 47 B. T. A. 784
(1942) ; Stephen Hexter, 47 B. T. A. 483 (1942) ; Estate of Frederick S. Fish, 45 B. T.
A. 120 (1941).
102. Compare Collins v. United States, 21 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 1262 (D. Va. 1937).
If the "other person" lacks a substantial adverse interest it would seem justifiable to
impose a gift tax on the surviving settlor with respect to his contribution because a
definitive transfer has occurred as a result of an event which, in accordance with his
command, marks the surrender of his dominion over the property. Cf. 2 PAUL, op. Cil.
supra note 7, at 1139. But if the "other person" enjoyed a substantial adverse interest
upon the creation of the trust, a gift tax would be imposed at that moment since the gift
would then be deemed complete. Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A, 1st,
1940) ; see Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F. (2d) 237, 241 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942), ceri.
denied, 317 U. S. 658 (1942). Cf. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S, 339 (1929).
But cf. First National Bank of Birmingham v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 816 (N. D.
Ala. 1939).
103. Brown v. Commissioner, 119 F. (2d) 983 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); Colonial Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 111 F. (2d) 740 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; Estate of John Moir, 47 B.
T. A. 765 (1942). See Commissioner v. Solomon, 124 F. (2d) 86, 89, n. 8 (C. C. A.
3d, 1941). Cf. George Washington, Sr., C. C. H. 1943 T. C. Serv. 1 13,021 (T. Ct. mem.).
104. See Collins v. United States, 21 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. 1262 (D. Va. 1937).
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consider him as donee of a power in order to prevent estate tax avoidance
with respect to the other's contribution."'a
The regulations make no mention of a power held by several trustees
who are all equally disinterested and have no beneficial interest whatsoever
in the appointive property. In this case the criteria which seem to be im-
plicit in the regulations do not seem to be of appreciable assistance. Sup-
pose the trustees are A, B, and C and that the power continues until the
death of all three. Is the property includible in the gross estate of each, or
is some fraction, perhaps one-third, taxable as each dies, or, again, is the
entire property taxable to the estate of the last surviving trustee? The
statute does not afford any basis for splitting the property into separate
taxable portions. If the power were to terminate upon the death of one
of the three trustees, this fractional treatment would permit a portion of
the assets to escape tax. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the fractional
treatment was intended to apply if the power continued but not if the
power ceased prior to the death of all three. Hence it seems that the ques-
tion is whether the property subject to the continuing power should be
taxed as each trustee dies or should be included only in the estate of the
trustee whose death finally terminates the power.
The raison d'&re of the estate tax levy is the cessation of the decedent's
interest, rather than the definitive creation of new interests at death.1 "i
It has accordingly been held that section 811 (d) applies to a grantor's
reserved power to revoke or modify a trust even though a power to revise
beneficial interests continues in another person after the grantor's death." 7
The situation is analogous to the creation of a testamentary trust, subject
to a power of appointment in the testator's wife. A similar rationale
might justify the conclusion that the entire appointive property is included
in the estate of each trustee despite the continuance of the power. But
one must be wary of a free translation of concepts to other contexts. In
the case of a grantor who is taxable under section 811 (d), the estate tax
105. See note 102 sn pra.
106. Compare Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95, 98 (1942); Ithaca Trust Co. v.
United States, 279 U. S. 151, 155 (1929) ; Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61, 62 (1924);
Y. 11. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47, 50 (1924). But compare the possible implicatibn in
Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U. S. 436, 444 (1933), referring to the decedents death as
"the source of valuable assurance passing from the dead to the living."
107. See Welch v. Terhune, 126 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942), cert. dc:icd, 317
U. S. 644 (1942) ; Estate of Edward Lothrop Ballard, 47 B. T. A. 784 (1942) ; Estate
of John H. Storer, 41 B. T. A. 1156 (1940). But cf. Fanny M. Dravo, 40 B. T. A.
309 (1939), aff'd, 119 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), where the Board held that the
decedent's reserved power was not ta-mble because his surviving brother could reshuffle
the decedent's dispositions. The decision in Fanny 3L Dravo was distinguished in the
Storer case on the ground that the decedent in the latter case could have stric:en out
the successor power. While Welch v. Tcrhiune cites the Storcr case, it apparently does
not rely on this distinction, and the Board itself seems to have abandoned the asserted
distinction in the Ballard case. Compare the Bryant trust in Helvering v. Hallock, 309
U. S. 106, 116 (1940) ; Estate of Peter D. Middlekauff, 2 T. C. No. 27 (1943).
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reaches the master of the trust. When the estate tax falls due again
because of a successor power in another person, it once more applies to a
power representing sole control in another. The circumstances are other-
wise in the case of the three trustees, since full control is only enjoyed by
the last surviving trustee if the power remains until his demise." 8
Perhaps the answer is revealed in oblique fashion by section 826(d),
added to the Code by section 403(c) of the 1942 Act, which entitles
the donee's executor to recover from the person "receiving" the property,
as a result of the exercise or nonexercise of a power of appointment,
a portion of the estate tax attributable to property taxable under section
811(f). Section 826(d) may rest on the assumption that the appointive
property must be freed from any remaining power to route it to others
before the duty to contribute arises.'0° Otherwise the alleged appointee
or taker in default might be placed in the unfortunate position of being
deprived of his interest after being required to pay a portion of the tax
attributed to that interest. 0 This assumption seems to be strengthened
by the fact that the rule of apportionment established by section 826(d)
does not apply if the donee provides his own scheme of incidence. The
statute thus purports to offer the donee two alternatives. He may abide
by the statutory allocation or fashion his own arrangement. 1 But there
is no such choice where others may redistribute the property, unless it
be a choice by sufferance. It is but a short step to an additional assump-
tion that taxability occurs under section 811(f) when the appointive
interests are settled beyond recall. However, a similar problem in ap-
portionment would arise in the case of separate successive powers, as
where A has a power to appoint the remainder of a trust, followed by
a power in B, if B survives A, and the intermediate life interests have
not yet terminated. 1 2 Section 826(d) might be understood as merely
attempting to apportion the tax burden equitably where equity is pos-
sible"" and as not determining the taxability of a power. The solution
108. This statement is based on the assumption that all are equally "disinterested."
109. See p. 530 infra.
110. Compare Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 46 (1939). But cf.
Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U. S. 184, 186-87 (1943). If the appointee or taker in de-
fault eventually received the property after the death of all three trustees and three
taxes were imposed, contribution would be required on three different occasions for the
receipt of the same property.
111. There are limitations upon the donee's selection of alternatives. See p. 531 hnira.
112. Compare Mapleton v. Mapleton, 4 Drew. 515 (ch. 1859). One might complicate
the matter by visualizing a power held jointly by three trustees, with successor trustees
joining in as one drops out through death or resignation. Furthermore, if the trustees
were an individual and a trust company, and the power continued in the company after
the death of the individual, the failure to impose tax at the latter's death would mean
the surrender of all tax on the power since a corporation is not subject to estate tax.
113. A somewhat similar question of apportionment would appear in a case where a
donee of a power exercises it by appointing a life estate to his son in conjunction with a
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to the mystery of the three trustees may be aided by the gift tax, which
reaches the inter vivos exercise of a power. If all the trustees exercised
their power jointly so that the various interests under the trust were
finally settled, only one gift tax would probably be imposed. Hence it is
reasonable to believe that only one estate tax should be imposed upon
a final settlement through death."
4
Powers to Consume Corpus •
A statute which proceeds to tax unexercised powers of appointment
runs squarely into a dispositive device which has hitherto been scarcely
considered in relation to the estate tax, namely, a power to invade corpus,
granted usually to a life tenant or to trustees on his behalf."' This de-
vice is particularly important where the life tenant is aged or physically
unable to support himself. The former language of section 811(f) did
not entail any tax consequences where the life tenant might invade prin-
cipal, since such a power merely lapses at death and unexercised powers
were not taxed. Nor, it seems, is such a power taxable under the general
language of section 811(a)... in view of the decision in Helvcring T,.
Safe Deposit & Trust Company of Baltimore."7 But the tax context
and consequences have now been altered.
If powers to consume principal are entirely exempt from estate tax, the
value of the amendments is seriously impaired. Instead of creating a
general "power of appointment" as usually understood by conveyancers,
a settlor or testator might create an unrestricted right to dip into corpus,
power in the son to appoint the remainder. However, if apportionment is impossible
here, the fault lies with the first donee since he created the uncertainty hovering over
the remainders. Still another case is represented by life estates for A and B and the
survivor of them, with a power of appointment exercisable jointly or by the survivor.
114. This result might lead to a skipping of estate tax in the following situation: A
and B are trustees, endowed with broad powers of amendment, exercisable jointly or by
the survivor while the life estates are outstanding. A dies before the remainder falls in
and the power continues in B. There is no estate tax with respect to A. Thereafter the
life estates terminate before B's death. Hence there is also no estate tax with respect to
B. It seems, however, that he might be liable for gift tax for he has, in effect, released
the power by permitting it to lapse without exercising it during the period allotted for
such exercise.
115. See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, §4.12; Dicus, Taxability of Rights of 11With-
drawal uzder Federal Estate Tax (1939) 17 CHi-KETm. L. REV. 209. From a non-tax
point of view, see Whiteside and Edelstein, Life Estates with Ponvr to Consmwe: Rights
of Creditors, Purchasers and Reinaindermen: A Study of INVew York Real Property Law
Sections 149-153 (1931) 16 Come. L. Q. 447.
116. Estate of Gertrude Leon Royce, 46 B. T. A. 1090 (1942). Cf. Edith Evelyn
Clark, 47 B. T. A. 865 (1942).
117. 316 U. S. 56 (1942). See Eisenstein, supra note 1, at 338. If there is nu gift
over of the principal and the trustee is accordingly required to distribute remaining
principal to the life tenant's estate, see 1 REST&TEtEx-r, TnusTs (1935) § 12S, com-
ment c, to the effect that the principal should be taxable under (a).
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the remainder passing to specified persons. Now there is obviously no
substantial difference between a general "power of appointment" and such
a power of invasion. As Mr. Paul has indicated, the holder of an unre-
stricted power to appropriate principal "enjoys the basic delights of own-
ership. If he exercised the power, the property would become his and pass
as part of his estate. His decision determines whether the property is to
pass to the appointed remaindermen." "' It may be that in the past tax
avoidance by means of this device has been comparatively infrequent.
But if the statute is redrawn to reach unexercised powers, all potential
methods of impairing the effectiveness of the statute must be nullified
within reasonable limitations. Once it is indicated that a power to invade
principal is a genuine loophole, this route to avoidance would probably
become quite popular. The fact that a power of invasion is an assurance
of desirable flexibility is not conclusive. If all powers of appointment
were viewed entirely in terms of flexibility in the final distribution of one's
wealth, they would never run the gauntlet of an estate tax.119
The committee reports reflect the broad purpose of reaching all powers,
whether or not they are "powers of appointment" in the usual technical
property sense. As the reports put it: "The term 'power of appointment'
includes all powers which are in substance and effect powers of appoint-
ment regardless of the nomenclature used in creating the power and local
property law connotations." 120 Hence if a life tenant may help himself at
will to the underlying principal, the corpus remaining at his death should
be subject to estate tax, even if such a power is not generally character-
ized as a power of appointment in the law of property.' 2 ' The life tenant
enjoys all the attributes of ownership except the formal trappings of
title. According to the regulations, "if a settlor transfers property in
trust for the life of his wife, with a power in the wife to appropriate or
consume the principal of the trust, the wife has a power of appoint-
ment." 122
118. See I PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 223.
119. The same immunity would be accorded life insurance if considered exclusively
as a "pressing social duty." Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 681 (1933). See H. R.
REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918) 22 (1939-1 Cumr. BULL., Pt. 2, pp. 101-02).
120. H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 160; SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 232. Compare the broad concept of a taxable gift emphasized in
H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 27 (1939-1 Cum. BULL., Pt. 2, p. 476) ;
SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 39 (1939-1 Cum. BULL., Pt. 2, p. 524);
Smith v. Shaughnessy, 63 Sup. Ct. 545, 547 (U. S. 1943); Commissioner v. Beck's
Estate, 129 F. (2d) 243, 244 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F.
(2d) 943, 945 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
121. Compare 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) §323(b), to the effect that a life
tenant "may also have a general power of appointment presently exercisable over the
remainder and a power to appropriate, sell or consume any part thereof." See also id.
§ 318(2) and comment j, where it is declared that a power to augment income, whether
or not restricted, is not commonly known as a power of appointment.
122. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (1). Cf. Ill. Laws 1943, p. 59, § 1(a).
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Undoubtedly a tax on powers of invasion will seriously affect the in-
ternal structure of family settlements. The power may no longer be given
to a beneficiary, unless one is willing to augment the estate tax revenues.
However, here again, as in other aspects, the statute pays due respect to
the needs of familial flexibility without impairing its basic framework.
It allows sufficient scope for the tax-free use of such powers if entrusted
to others, since the provisions exempting two types of powers are equally
applicable here." There is no tax, for example, if a son may invade cor-
pus for the benefit of his mother pursuant to a trust indenture created by
his father. 21 'Similarly, even if there is no exemption on the basis of
relationship, immunity is still possible if the power is conferred upon a
person who has no beneficial interest in the property. The power may
thus reside in persons who would in all probability be very susceptible to
requests for more corpus.'2 Where an exemption is sought by entrusting
the power to a disinterested trustee, it is necessary to make certain that
he has no vested or contingent interest in the property and that he has no
power to appoint in favor of himself, his estate, his creditors, or the
creditors of his estate. If the trustee has a remote contingent interest in
123. It has been suggested that a literal reading of section 811(M (2) (A) allows a
tax-free power in the donor's wife to consume corpus. See Browne, Powers of :ppoint-
nent as Affected by the Federal Revenne Act of 1012 (1942) 22 Tnvsr BuLL. 2, 4. Cf.
Alexander, Taxation of Powers of Appointment Under the Revenu Act of 142 (1Q43)
56 HAav. L. REv. 742, 754, n. 62. This section describes the exempt class or rela-
tives as "the spouse of the decedent, spouse of the creator of the power, descendants of
the decedent or his spouse, descendants (other than the decedent) of the creator of the
power or his spouse, spouses of such descendants." The argument is that the parentheti-
cal phrase excludes the donee only as a descendant of the donor, but nkjt as a spouse of
the donor. But this argument proves too much. The statute makes no distinction between
a power to consume corpus and the technical power of appointment. It would therefore
have to be argued that a power in the donor's widow to appoint to herself ky deed-the
most general of general powers-is free from tax although such a donee may obviously
appoint to anyone she pleases. But cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 8124(b) (2). Such a
power would obviously not be limited to the group of relatives mentitned in section
811 (f) (2) (A). The same "literal" interpretation would require a hivding that if the
daughter-in-law of the creator of a power may appoint to herself she nevertheless has a
tax-free power, whereas if the daughter-donee may appoint to herself the power is tax-
able. The parenthetical phrase seems to reflect merely an excess of caution and dues not
obscure the intention of destroying all tax immunities enjoyed by the general power. Cf.
Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476, 479-'0 (1943) ; United States v. Ameri-
can Trucking Associations, 310 U. S. 534, 543 (1940) ; Helvering v. New York Trust
Co., 292 U. S. 455, 464 (1934).
124. The above example would hold true even if the son were the remaindernian. If
he died before his mother there would be no estate tax as a result of the p~jwer, since
at death he would have no power to appoint himself. Obviously if the remainder passed
as part of his estate, there would be a tax under section 811 (a). See 1 PAuL, op. cit.
szupra note 7, § 4.09.
125. Compare Blunt v. Kelly, 41 F. Supp. 721, 723 (D. N. J. 1941), aff'd, 131 F. (2d)
632 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942).
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the property he incurs the risk of estate tax, and also gift tax if he re-
leases the power during his lifetime or makes payments of principal.1'"
Alth6ugh the statute provides that a power is immune from tax if
specified conditions are met, settlors and their legal advisers should be
wise enough to realize that compliance with the bare words of a statute
does not necessarily gain the desired freedom from tax.127 The com-
posite picture may nevertheless reveal a distortion of the statutory pur-
pose. 12 For example, if a life tenant may at will remove a disinterested
trustee who has unfettered discretion to pay over corpus to him, and
appoint another trustee who will possess the same power, it may reason-
ably be inferred that the life tenant has an unlimited power to invade
corpus for his own benefit because he is free to appoint a compliant trustee.
On the other hand, the strength of this inference might be seriously
weakened if the consent of the remaindermen, whose estate would neces-
sarily be diminished if corpus were appropriated, were necessary in order
to remove the trustee or appoint a new one. All relevant data would have
to be considered. If the consent of a number of persons were required,
including that of the remaindermen, there would obviously be little scope
for avoidance. At any rate the statute does not purport to reach a mere
power to remove a trustee.
All discussion thus far has proceeded on the assumption that under the
terms of the trust one may freely help one's self or another to principal. 20
An additional problem arises where the power to invade is subject to the
careful scrutiny of a court of equity and the invasion may not exceed
judicially enforceable standards. For example, the settlor may provide
a specified income for his wife and permit the appropriation of sufficient
principal to offset any deficiency in income. Again, the settlor may sanc-
tion the use of corpus for the life tenant's "comfort and support," a type
of provision which may or may not create an enforceable standard.00
126. See p. 534 infra.
127. Compare the now classic example of Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935).
128. See, generally, Radin, A Short Way with Statutes (1942) 56 HAv. L. REV.
388, 398.
129. Compare In re Ryder, [1914] 1 Ch. 865, and In re Richards, [1902] 1 Ch. 76, with
Re Fox, 62 L. T. 762 (Ch. 1890), and Re Pedrotti's Will, 27 Beav. 583 (Ch. 1859).
130. This question of an enforceable limitation upon the life tenant's power to consume
principal arises frequently in connection with the deduction allowed for contributions
to charity. Compare Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 151 (1929); Com-
missioner v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 133 F. (2d) 753 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1943) with Commissioner v. Merchants National Bank of Boston, 132 F. (2d)
483 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942), cert. granted, 63 Sup. Ct. 1031 (U. S. 1943); Gammons v.
Hassett, 121 F. (2d) 229 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 673 (1941);
Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Hassett, 43 F. Supp. 401 (D. Mass. 1942);
see Helvering v. Union Trust Co., 125 F. (2d) 401, 403 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942), cert.
denied, 316 U. S. 696 (1942); discussion in 1 PAUL, Op. cit. supra note 7, § 12,26.
Cf. Hess and Guterman, supra note 39, at 341.
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Assuming, however, that the power of invasion is governed by a standard,
the question is whether tax may be imposed if the power is not othenvise
exempt. Under such circumstances it seems to be correct to hold that the
power is taxable to the extent that the decedent may, at his death, dip into
principal to bring the income yield up to the income standard. For ex-
ample, if the trust has yielded an income of $20,000 for the year ter-
minating shortly before the death of the life tenant, the income standard
of the trust is $30,000, and the decedent at the moment of death may
dip into corpus to obtain an additional $10,000, there would be a power
to invade corpus to the extent of $10,000.' Possible future resort to
corpus should not enter into the calculation since the power is contingent
with respect to all subsequent years. Death, moreover, has fully disclosed
that the contingency will never materialize. If a decedent's contingent
remainder which is obliterated by his death is not included in his gross
estate, a similarly contingent power should not fare worse.
1 2
COLLATERAL CHANGES
Appointments and Gifts in Default to Charity
Under the former statute it was uncertain whether property appointed
under a general power to a charity within the meaning of section 812(d)
or 861 (a) (3) was deductible as a bequest, devise, legacy or transfer to
charity. 3 A statute which treats the donee of a power as owner for pur-
poses of taxation should certainly treat him as owner for purposes of the
available deductions. "Once his quasi property, always his quasi proper-
ty." "-1 The 1942 Revenue Act carries out this policy and permits the
deduction if the property passes to charity by appointment or as a re-
131. If the life tenant irrevocably waives his right to consume principal in a particular
year he should be liable for gift tax, with due consideration of his enjoyment of the
income to be yielded by the undisturbed principal. Such waiver may occur by virtue of
a failure to invade within the time stipulated in the trust instrument. The vaiver may
be treated as a release intended to take effect at death. See further note 195 infro.
132. See note 21, supra. While the power may be measured by some standard such
as illness or emergency, the contingencies may be so many and so brad as to amount
to an outright power of invasion. Cf. Mary E. Wenger, 42 B. T. A. 225 (1940), aff'd,
127 F. (2d) 523 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 646 (1942); Helvering
v. Evans, 126 F. (2d) 270 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 638 (1942). If the
occurrence of the contingency is within the control of the life tenant, it may reasonably
be held that he has an immediate power. Cf. 2 PAuL. op. cit. supra note 7, at 1137. At
any rate, one should look to the life tenant's right as of the moment of death, and the
measurement of such right may well entail the difficult task of determining how the local
court would have reacted to a request for principal. See generally, 1 RsrcsTrTE!:;T,
TRUSTS (1935) § 128, comments d, e, and § 187.
133. See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 9.04; Griswold, supra note 47, at 950. Cf.
Thompson v. Pew, 214 Mass. 520, 102 N. E. 122 (1913) (lapse statute).
134. 1 PAuL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 422.
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mainder in default of appointment." Rules governing charitable deduc-
tions are thereby made applicable to appointive assets, the decedent-donee
being treated as owner.' The committee reports state, in addition, that
the "amendment is clarifying with respect to property passing to charity
under a general power of appointment exercised by the decedent and in-
cludible in the gross estate." 11 If the power itself is not taxable the
amendment does not function, since the assets passing to charity are not
includible in the gross estate.
Property Previously Taxed
Another deduction allowed in computing the estate tax is the value of
any property subject to estate or gift tax within five years prior to the
death of the decedent, "where such property can be identified as having
been received by the decedent from the donor by gift, or from such prior
decedent by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance, or which can be iden-
135. Pub. L. No. 753, §403(b).
136. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.44, as amended by T. D. 5239, 1943 INT. Rnv.
BULL. No. 6, 213. A deduction should therefore be allowed where the donee of a power
exercises it by appointing to charity, subject to a power in a designated individual to
allocate the property among different institutions. Cf. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Bur-
net, 59 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) ; Beggs v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 599 (Ct.
Cl. 1939). However, in accordance with the law governing charitable dispositions by own-
ers of property, the appointment to charity may not be subject to a power in another to
divert to private purposes, Knoernschild v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A.
.7th, 1938) ; Davison v. Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 16 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; Girard Trust
Co., 41 B. T. A. 157 (1940), rev'd on other grounds, 122 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941),
unless the other person renounces the power within the time allowed for filing the estate
tax return and the property consequently passes to charity. Pub. L. No. 753, § 408,
amending §§812(d), 861(a) (3). Compare the confused opinion in Norris v. Com-
missioner, 134 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943). However, if the property is designated
for private purposes, and another person is authorized to divert the property to charity,
no deduction is allowed. Burdick v. Commissioner, 117 F. (2d) 972 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 631 (1941) ; cf. First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Reynolds,
46 F. Supp. 497 (D. Minn. 1942). But compare the decisions in Commissioner v. First
National Bank of Atlanta, 102 F. (2d) 129 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Dimock v. Corwin, 99 F.
(2d) 799 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), aff'd, 306 U. S. 363 (1939) ; Mead v. Welch, 95 F. (2d) 617
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938) ; Humphrey v. Millard, 79 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Estate
of Dudley S. Blossom, 45 B. T. A. 691 (1941). Furthermore, if property is appointed to
charity, which pays a portion thereof to a private taker in default in compromise of a con-
test over the validity of the appointment, the deduction should be limited to the amount
retained by charity. Thompson's Estate v. Commissioner, 123 F. (2d) 816 (C. C. A. 2d,
1941) ; Estate of Sage v. Commissioner, 122 F. (2d) 480 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), cert. de-
nied, 314 U. S. 699 (1942) ; E. T. 17, 1940-1 Cu-m. BULL. 231; cf. Robbins v. Commis-
sioner, 111 F. (2d) 828 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940). Contra: Continental Illinois Nat. Bank &
Trust Co., 38 B. T. A. 220 (1938), which is now in effect overruled. For a discussion
of the content of "charity," see 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, c. 12.
137. H. R. RES'. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 161; SEN. REI,. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
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tified as having been acquired in exchange for property so received." 12
Prior to the enactment of the 1942 Act there was no specific reference to
powers of appointment. 3 ' It is now provided, however, that property
included in the gross estate of the prior decedent under section 811 (f)
is deductible as previously taxed property.140 There is no express pro-
vision that the estate of the decedent-donee of the power is entitled to
the deduction when the power was bestowed upon him within the appli-
cable five-year period. But the words "gift. bequest, devise" may be
broad enough to include a power to appoint property received from
another person. However, in the case of a taxable power held by several
trustees, the power continuing until the death of all, the statute does not
seem broad enough to protect the trustees other than the first to die,
assuming that their deaths occur at intervals of five years.
Apportionment
An estate tax on special powers must in all fairness provide for the
allocation of a proportionate share of the tax burden to the appointive
assets. The increase in taxable assets as a result of a power which is not
exercisable for the direct benefit of the donee may drastically affect the
rate bracket. 4 ' And in the absence of an apportionment provision the
entire tax is payable out of the donee's individual estate, 42 which may
be completely depleted.' 43 The amendments with respect to powers there-
138. The deduction is subject to ,-arious qualifications in the governing sections. See
§§ 812 (c) and 861 (a) (2), as amended by Pub. L. No. 753, §§ 405(b) (c) and 407.
139. This omission is not necessarily fatal. Cf. Commissioner v. Fletcher Savings
& Trust Co., 59 F. (2d) 50S (C. C. A. 7th, 1932), holding that for the purpose of section
812(c) property is acquired by "inheritance" where the surviving spouse of a tenancy
by the entirety succeeds to sole ownership. See, further, G. C. M. 8481, X-1 Cur. Byu.t.
451 (1931).
140. Section 407. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.41 (a) (1). It is not clear whether
this provision is merely declaratory of prior law in the case of property passing under
an exercised general power. It seems that if the amendment relating to charitable deduc-
tions is declaratory in such a case, the same should be true of Pub. L. No. 753, § 407.
141. See, e.g., Whitney v. State Tax Comm., 309 U. S. 530 (1940).
142. See Dexter v. Jackson, 245 Mlass. 333, 140 N. E. 267 (1923); cf. Matter of
Rogers, 249 App. Div. 238, 291 N. Y. Supp. 815 (2d Dept 1936), motion for leave to
appeal denied, 273 N. Y. 630 (1937), 50 HAn,. L. REv. 844. See Pennsylvania Co. for In-
surances on Lives v. Lederer, 292 Fed. 629, 630 (E. D. Pa. 1921). The decision in Riggs
v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95 (1942), indicates that this rule is not implicit in the federal
estate tax law. See also Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476, 479 (1943).
143. See Highfield v. Delaware Trust Co., 34 Del. 306, 313-14, 152 At. 124, 127-2,
(1930). It has been suggested that section 811(f) might be held invalid as to special
powers if an apportionment provision were omitted. See Comment (1943) 56 HAnv.
L. REv. 428, 453. While the lack of such a provision would induce unwarranted hard-
ship, it is doubtful whether invalidity would necessarily follow. Whitney v. State Tax
Comm., 309 U. S. 530 (1940), sustaining an estate tax on special powers, did not
allude to any need for apportionment Cf. Lewellyn v. Frick, 2o3 U. S. 238, 251 (1925).
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fore provide that unless the decedent-donee directs otherwise in his will,
the executor is "entitled to recover from the person receiving such
property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release of a power
of appointment such portion of the total tax paid as the value of such
property bears to the sum of the net estate and the amount of the
exemption allowed in computing the net estate, determined under section
935(c), or section 861,"4 as the case may be."' 14' This provision is
entirely compatible with local statutes which allocate the ultimate inci-
dence of the tax "as to properties actually handled as part of the estate
by the executor."
' 146
Prior to the 1942 Act the only federal provision directing apportion-
ment of tax related to life insurance proceeds payable to a specific bene-
ficiary."4 7 The portion of tax payable out of the proceeds was determined
by the ratio of the taxable proceeds to the net estate. A literal application
of this formula deprived the insurance beneficiary of a pro rata portion
of the specific exemption allowed in computing the over-all tax and it was
not clear whether the language was sufficiently elastic to allow the intru-
sion of equitable considerations. 48 This situation has now been corrected
in the life insurance provision, 4 and the revised ratio is equally applica-
ble to powers of appointment.1 ' Thus if the appointive assets are worth
$200,000, the net estate is valued at $940,000, and the estate tax is
$303,500, the appointive assets must contribute % of the tax, or $60,700,
since the percentage is determined by the ratio of $200,000 to the sum of
$940,000 plus $60,000, the specific exemption.
The formula of apportionment does not attribute the appointive prop-
erty entirely to the higher rate brackets. In the example given above the
144. Section 935(c), as amended by Pub. L. No. 753, §414, grants a $60,000 specific
exemption for purposes of the additional estate tax, and section 861, as amended by
Pub. L. No. 753, § 412, allows a $2,000 specific exemption to estates of nonresident aliens.
145. Pub. L. No. 753, § 403(c), adding to section 826 a new subsection (d). It is
further provided that "if there is more than one such person the executor shall be en-
titled to recover from such persons in the same ratio." The language of the section con-
stitutes a clarification of the House Bill.
146. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U. S. 95, 102 (1942). There seems to be an implica-
tion here that local apportionment statutes do not apply to property subject to powers
of appointment. See also id. at 98-99.
147. Section 826(c).
148. Compare United States Trust Co. of New York v. Sears, 29 F. Supp. 643 (D.
Conn. 1939); and see discussion in 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 13.55; Karch, The
Apportionmewnt of Death Taxes (1940) 54 HARv. L. REv. 10, 27.
149. Pub. L. No. 543, § 404. See SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 236.
150. Section 403 (c) of the House bill adopted the revised formula, but no correlative
change was made with respect to life insurance. The Senate made the necessary correc-
tion as to insurance, and made technical changes in the section on powers so as to co-
ordinate both apportionment provisions. See SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1942) 233-34; CoNF. REP. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 69 (Amendment No,
398).
[Vol. 52: 494
19431 POWERS OF APPOINTMENT AND ESTATE TAXES 529
decedent's personal assets are ultimately liable for a tax burden of
$242,800, whereas the burden upon such property if it comprised the
entire net estate would be $229,700. Under the formula all the taxable
assets are deemed to contribute the same amount of tax burden per unit
value. There is nothing arbitrary in this rationale."'s It is no more cor-
rect to say that a particular item of property is responsible for the highest
estate tax bracket than it is to say that a particular item of taxable income
is responsible for the highest income tax bracket. "2 All items of taxable
property are simply added together to make one numerical total upon
which the tax is imposed.1' 3 Appointive property should not be treated
as a separate taxable unit in the estate, for from the estate tax point of
view such property is as much the decedent's as any other included in the
taxable estate, as, for example, property owned by the entirety and life
insurance, particularly where the decedent did not pay the premiums but
possessed an incident of ownership at death. Ioreover, if the highest
brackets were attributed to the appointive property, the fund to be re-
ceived by the appointee or taker in default might be virtually depleted.",
The apportionment provision raises a number of problems. For exam-
ple, suppose a trust provides that the income is to be paid to A and B
during their joint lives, and thereafter to the survivor, and that 1 has a
power to appoint the remainder. Assume further that A predeceases B
and appoints the remainder to C and D. Section 826(d) provides that
A's executor may recover a specified portion of the tax "from the person
receiving such property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release
of a power of appointment." The question in this case is whether the
appointees have "received" the property at the time of A's death."' The
word "receiving" may be read very narrowly to mean actual enjoyment
of the property by the appointee. In that event A's executor would not
be able to seek reimbursement until the termination of B's life estate. But
this interpretation may sacrifice the evident purpose of reimbursing the
151. But cf. Alexander, supra note 123, at 753.
152. Compare, however, Finance Act, 1922, 12 & 13 GEo. V., c. 17, § 20(2) (3) (4).
153. "Since the tax is measured by the total transferred to one or many, each pays
a tax measured, not by the benefit he receives, but in some degree by the benefit others
receive." Matter of Vanderbilt, 281 N. Y. 297, 316, 22 N. E. (2d) 379, 390 (1939), aff'd
szub nor. Whitney v. State Tax Comm., 309 U. S. 530 (1940). See also 1 PAuL, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 781, 783.
154. Thus, under the facts in the above example, the appointive property would ha
liable for $73,800 of the tax, or the difference betwveen a total tax of .203,500 on a net
estate of $940,000 and a total tax of 229,700 on a net estate of $740,000. The dispro-
portionate burden cast upon the appointive property would be augmented as the pro-
portion of individual assets to total assets increased.
155. The problem would be similar where the property was allowed to pass to the
takers in default. If the donee has a general power he may appoint the property to his
executor, who may dispose of it for the purpose of satisfying the burden allocated to the
property by section 826 (d).
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donee's estate for taxes attributable to appointive property and seriously
affect the shares bequeathed out of his individual estate. Moreover, the
executor might be placed in the unhappy position of being required to
keep the estate open for a number of years.' The policy of the provi-
sion might be more appropriately fulfilled by a holding that "receiving"
refers to the acquisition of a right to property, present or future, which
may not be destroyed or diverted by the act of another person."5 7 This
interpretation, however, would not obviate all difficulties. Thus, in the
example above, C and D would be required to contribute a portion of the
tax to the executor before actual enjoyment of the property.,, Further-
more, either appointee might die after reimbursing the executor and before
his remainder vests in enjoyment, with the result that his share would
ultimately pass to another person designated by the donee as an alternate
taker. 59
156. Consider, for example, a case where the donee appoints a life estate in A, with
remainder in B. The donee's executor would have to await the death of A in order to
obtain reimbursement from B. This practical factor should be given weight in interpret-
ing section 826(d). Cf. Learned Hand, J., concurring in Thomas v. Commissioner, 100
F. (2d) 408, 411 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). "Expediency may tip the scales when arguments are
nicely balanced." Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U. S. 319 (1932), 330. An alter-
native possibility might be to treat the trustee as "receiving" the property in this case.
But this view does not harmonize very well with the provision in section 827(d) that
"if there is more than one such person entitled, the executor shall be entitled to recover
from such persons in the same ratio." Furthermore, in the case considered in the text
the executor would not be able to get recoupment from the trust, apart from the fact
that the trustee does not receive the property by virtue of the exercise of the power,
as long as B's life estate continued, for otherwise B's interest would be impaired and he
would in effect contribute. Finally, apportionment is an effort to do justice among those
persons who receive beneficial interests in property and "person" probably refers to such
recipients. Cf. Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U. S. 393 (1941).
157. Compare Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176 (1943) ; Robinette v. Helvcring,
318 U. S. 184 (1943) ; United States v. Frank, 133 F. (2d) 1009 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943);
Commissioner v. McLean, 127 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942); Commissioner v.
Marshall, 125 F. (2d) 943 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942), dealing with a somewhat analogous prob-
lem in gift taxation. The interpretation suggested seems to be strengthened by the fact
that in section 827(b) personal liability for the tax is imposed on the "person in posses-
sion of the property by reason of the exercise, nonexercise, or release of a power of
appointment."
158. Compare §§ 925-27, providing for a postponement of estate tax attributable to
the inclusion in the gross estate of a future interest.
159. It may be that the contingent remainderman would also be required to contribute.
But he may find himself in the predicament of contributing a portion of the tax and
never receiving the property itself. Cf. Goodwin v. McGowan, 47 F. Supp. 798 (W. D.
N. Y. 1942), where the taxpayer was held liable for a gift tax upon the value of a coni-
tingent remainder which disappeared after his transfer thereof. Local apportionment
statutes surmount many of the problems created by trusts by providing for the payment
of the tax allocable to the trust property out of its corpus without apportionment as
among the various trust interests. N. Y. DEcEDENT EsTATE LAW § 124; PA. STAT. ANN.
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Section 826(d) states that the formula provided to allocate the tax
applies "unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will." "I Does this
proviso override the local law governing the scope of the donee's discre-
tion, or the donor's directions as to payment of tax attributable to the
appointive property? For example, the donee of a taxable special power
may desire to redistribute the tax burden by forcing the appointive prop-
erty to pay the tax imposed by the higher brackets applicable to his estate.
Or a donor may have provided that the appointive property is to pass un-
scathed by any death taxes, and that the donee shall pay the entire tax out
of his individual property.
Insofar as local law is concerned, it seems that section 826(d) of the
federal statute, except for its own rule of apportionment, leaves it where
it finds it.' This section is designed to relieve the donee of a special
power from the misfortune of bearing a tax burden which he cannot
satisfy out of the property producing the burden.6 2 There is no intention
to expand the area of such a donee's appointive discretion as established
by the donor, especially since an increase in the portion of tax required
to be paid out of the appointive property might be an unreasonable re-
shuffling of the respective tax burdens. However, since the donee, by
remaining silent, would subject the appointive property to the formula
established by section 826(d), there is no reason why he may not lessen
the burden otherwise attributable to such property by an explicit direc-
tion in his will. Furthermore, a testamentary provision to this effect
should be valid even if the donee's power is exercisable only by deed.
The donor's direction that the donee pay the entire tax would, on the
other hand, probably not prevent the latter's estate from invoking sec-
tion 826(d). Any argument to the effect that the donee accepted the
power subject to a stated condition as to tax liability is not persuasive.
One might just as well contend that the donee of a special power accepted
it with the understanding that no part of the appointive property could be
diverted for purposes beyond the scope of the power. On the other hand,
(Purdon, Supp. 1941) tit. 201 § 44; R. I. Laws 1938, c. 43, as amended by Laws 1939,
c. 664.
Another problem to be considered is that arising frum a comprumise between tile
takers in default and the appointees so that the appuintment is recognized in part. In
such case the takers in default would probably be required to contribute on the gruund
that their position is similar to that of remaindermen receiving property as a result of
the donee's deliberate failure to appoint. Cf. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. uf
Baltimore, 316 U. S. 56 (1942).
160. The New York apportionment statute, DEcUM'NT ESTATE LAw § 124, pruvides
that its rule of apportionment does not govern "in a case where a testatur otherwise
directs in his will" or "in a case where by written instrument executed inter vivos direc-
tion is given for apportionment within the fund of taxes assessed upon the specific fund
dealt with in such inter vivos instrument."
161. Compare Comment (1943) 56 HAv. L. RE%. 423, 453, n. 196.
162. See Comment (1929) 42 HAnv. L. REv. 419.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52: 494
the donor may provide that the tax attributable to the appointive prop-
erty at the donee's death shall be satisfied out of the former's property."03
In this case the formula of section 826(d) should not apply, at least to
the extent that the donor or his estate is able to pay the tax, since the
purpose of the statute is to relieve the donee, and not the donor who
assumes the tax liability.
A number of other questions may be briefly noted. For example, if
the appointive assets are includible in the gross estate and then deductible
because they pass to charity, must the charity pay an allocable portion of
the tax? It seems fair to hold, as one court indicated with respect to
life insurance,' 64 that since the assets passing to charity do not contribute
to the tax burden, they should not be subjected to the rule of apportion-
ment." 5  However, the problem becomes more difficult where the assets
are appointed in trust, so that the charity's receipt of the property must
await the termination of a life estate. If all the tax attributable to the
intervening estate is payable out of the life tenant's interest in the prop-
erty, the purpose of the trust may be severely mutilated. 10 A similar
question is presented by a gift to charity subject to an annuity for a pri-
vate beneficiary.' 7 The proper allocation of tax incidence where a charity
is involved is important for the additional reason that it affects the
amount of estate tax due from the estate as a whole.' These are prob-
163. Compare Matter of Duryea, 277 N. Y. 310, 14 N. E. (2d) 369 (1938).
164. See Commissioner v. Pupin's Estate, 107 F. (2d) 745, 746 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939)
cf. Matter of Starr, 157 Misc. 103, 282 N. Y. Supp. 957 (Surr. Ct. 1935); Wilkinson's
Estate, 37 Pa. D. & C. 243 (1940). But cf. Estate of Bernays, 7 So. (2d) 444 (Fla.
1942).
165. It is assumed that the decedent-donee has not directed that tax be paid out of
the appointive property.
166. See Morristown Trust Co. v. Childs, 128 N. J. Eq. 524, 17 A. (2d) 559 (1940).
Compare Grainger's Ex'rs & Trustees v. Pennebaker, 247 Ky. 324, 56 S. W. (2d) 1007
(1932); Commonwealth-Merchants Trust Co. v. Seglie, 127 N. J. Eq. 160, 12 A. (2d)
153 (1940) ; Gates v. Plainfield Trust Co., "121 N. J. Eq. 460, 191 Atl. 304 (1937), aff'd,
122 N. 3. Eq. 366, 194 Atl. 65 (1937); In re Diehl's Executor, 88 N. J. Eq. 310, 102
Atl. 738 (1917), aff'd, 89 N. 3. Eq. 209, 103 Atd. 322 (1918); Title Guarantee & Trust
Co. v. Lohrke, 102 Atl. 660 (N. J. Ch. 1917) ; Matter of Tracy, 179 N. Y. 501, 72 N. E.
519 (1904); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Lambeth, 213 N. C. 576, 197 S. E. 179
(1938) ; Wellman v. Cleveland Trust Co., 107 Ohio St. 267, 140 N. E. 104 (1923), with
Brown's Estate, 208 Pa. 161, 57 At. 360 (1904) ; Penn-Gaskell's Estate (No. 1), 208
Pa. 342, 57 Atl. 714 (1904) ; Crane's Estate, 314 Pa. 193, 170 Atl. 284 (1934) ; Henris's
Estate, 53 Pa. Super. 633 (1913).
167. See the principle of allocation employed in Matter of Tracy, 179 N. Y. 501, 72
N. E. 519 (1904); In re Kaegebehn, 16 N. J. Misc. 388, 1 A. (2d) 56 (Orphans Ct.
1938) ; Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113, 38 N. E. 512 (1894) ; Warner's Estate, 30
Pa. D. & C. 599 (1937); Wellman v. Cleveland Trust Co., 107 Ohio St. 267, 140 N. E.
104 (1923). See Note (1938) 117 A. L. R. 121, 124.
168. Sections 812(d), 861(a) (3); see Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476
(1943) ; Elroy N. Clark, 1 T. C. 663 (1943).
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lems which require legislative response after a thorough reexamination
of apportionment in all its ramifications. 0 9 The rates have reached a level
where mere tinkering here and there is inadequate."'
Transferee Liability and Estate Tax Lien
Another amendment provides that if the estate tax is not paid when
due the "person in possession of the property by reason of the exercise.
nonexercise, or release of a power of appointment" shall be personally
liable for the tax "to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent's
death, of such property." A similar personal liability is imposed against
all recipients of property includible in the gross estate."1 This amend-
ment relates solely to the Government's right of collection, and does not
affect the ultimate distribution of the tax burden among the various
beneficiaries of the decedent's taxable assets.'7 2 The 1942 Act also pro-
vides that all persons personally liable for tax under section 827(b) are
included within the term "transferee" for purposes of transferee proceed-
ings."' The appointive assets, like all property included in the gross es-
tate, are subject to the ten-year estate tax lien.
17 4
169. Compare the problems arising out of insurance payable in installments. See 1
PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 787.
170. The Treasury has proposed a federal apportionment statute. See statement of
Air. Paul, supra note 1, at 94. There is no reason for confining the federal statute to
life insurance and powers of appointment. For a very early suggestion uf federal appo'r-
tionment, see Hearings before Committee on TI'aYs and Means with Reference to the
New Revenue Bill, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918) 1066.
171. Section 827(b) of the Code, as amended by Pub. L. No. 753, § 411. Prior to this
amendment personal liability was expressly imposed only against recipients of taxable
inter vivos transfers and insurance beneficiaries. The committee reports, explaining the
broadening of the section, state: ". . . all the assets referred to in section 811 (defining
the gross estate] are treated equally for purposes of inclusion in the gross estate and the
holders or recipients of all such assets are accordingly placed on the same plane of per-
sonal liability for the tax." H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 168; S=,:.
REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 241. There is scope for further improve-
ment. Compare the results in John Hancock 'Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Helvering,
128 F. (2d) 745 (App. D. C. 1942); Equitable Life Assurance Society, 46 B. T. A. 51t1
(1942).
172. Section 827(b) seems to be defective in various contexts. For example, supp.,e
A is the life tenant of trust property and B is the donee of a power over the remainder.
If B predeceases A, B's will exercising the power, there is apparently no one in pos.es-
sion of the property by reason of the exercise of the power. The trustee's possession
derives from the donor.
173. Section 900(e), as amended by Pub. L. No. 753, §411. See 1 PAUL, Op. Cit.
supra note 7, at § 13.50.
174. Section 827(a). See, generally, Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U. S. 329
(1943).
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The Gift Tax
Any substantive amendment of the estate tax law involves a legislative
consideration of the gift tax. 17 5 Otherwise the estate tax changes might
be conveniently avoided by inter vivos dispositions without any offsetting
tax cost. The gift tax statute has therefore been expanded by an amend-
ment 171 which "is coextensive with the estate tax amendment." 11? In
short, the inter vivos release or exercise of a power of appointment con-
stitutes a taxable gift.1 ' Furthermore, all powers to appoint are regarded
as powers taxable under the gift tax, with the exception of the two types




The amendment obviates the need of resolving a troublesome question.
Prior to the amendment the gift tax, unlike the estate tax, was completely
silent on the subject of powers of appointment. It was therefore thought
that the release or exercise of a power during lifetime was not subject
to gift tax,'8" for it would seem strange to attribute to Congress the inten-
tion of taxing the inter vivos release of a general power where Congress
had failed to impose estate tax on unexercised general powers relinquished
through death,' and while Congress had expressly imposed an estate
tax upon an exercise it had failed to be so specific when levying a gift
tax. On the other hand, it might be held that there is no need to visit
all the sins of omission of the estate tax upon the gift tax.18 2 The
language of the gift tax is extremely broad, and the committee reports
emphasize the desire to reach all transactions whereby "property or a
property right is donatively passed to or conferred upon another, regard-
less of the means or the device employed in its accomplishment." '' A
175. INT. REv. CODE, c. 4 (1939). The gift tax is also a junior partner of the income
tax, see Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176, 179, n. 1 (1943), and, as a result, com-
plications ensue. See PAUL, Op. cit. supra note 7, § 7.02 and v. 17.
176. Pub. L. No. 753, § 452, adding a new subsection (c) to section 1000. In similar
fashion Pub. L. No. 753, § 453, inserts a gift tax amendment to supplement Pub, L. No.
753, § 402, which drastically revises the estate tax liability incurred by community prop-
erty. See Comment (1942) 31 CALi. L. REv. 60.
177. See H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 169; SEN. REP. No. 1631,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 242.
178. The statutory language is: "An exercise or release of a power of appointment
shall be deemed a transfer of property by the individual possessing such power." See
also U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(b).
179. There is also the proviso intended to prevent a succession of tax exempt powers.
180. Compare Griswold, supra note 50 at 953; Alexander, supra note 123, at 745.
181. See Edith Evelyn Clark, 47 B. T. A. 865, 866 (1942); cf. Commissioner v.
Solomon, 124 F. (2d) 86 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941), which avoids the issue by holding that
a power excluding the donee from its benefits is nongeneral. But cf. Eisenstein, supra
note 1, at 315, 317.
182. Compare 2 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 1168.
183. H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 28 (1939-1 Cum. BULL, Pt. 2,
pp. 476-77) ; SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 27 (1939-1 Cuz. BULL., Pt.
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person who may appoint property to himself, but, in lieu of such appoint-
ment, releases the property to designated remaindermen, is in effect
transferring his own property. s4 He has simply omitted an intermediate
step. In addition, the inter vivos exercise of a general power might be
regarded as a taxable gift in accordance with the sensible principle that
"the concept of a transfer, so painfully developed in respect of taxes on
estates, was not flung aside and scouted" in imposing tax "upon transfers
during life." '185 Congress definitely intended to exact a price for inter
vivos dispositions which avoided the estate tax net. 8 3
The Senate report disclosed legislative awareness of the problem of
inter vivos exercise or release, stating that the amendments "should not
be construed as a limitation upon the application of the existing gift tax
law with respect to the exercise or release of a power of appointment." 1s
Questions of interpretation arising under the old statute would therefore
be left entirely to the courts, without any legislative comment of a declara-
tory character. The Senate, however, approved a floor amendment, which
was ultimately adopted in the 1942 Act, relieving from gift tax all re-
leases of powers of appointment prior to January 1, 1943. Subsequent
amendments have extended the period for tax-free releases to June 30,
1943, and more recently to February 29, 1944.115 The apparent purpose
of these changes was to make certain that donees of existing powers who
were releasing them in order to avoid the basic estate tax amendments
would not be subjected to gift tax under the statute as it stood prior to
amendment." 9 The amendment, of course, goes further since it absolves
from gift tax all releases prior to March 1, 1944, regardless of motiva-
2, p. 524). See Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176, 18O (1943); Commissionerv. Mar-
shall, 125 F. (2d) 943, 945 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942).
184. Prior to such release he is apparently liable for income tax on the Clifford prin-
ciple. Richardson v. Commissioner, 121 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314
U. S. 684 (1941); cf. Andrew Jergens, 2 C. C. H. 1942 B. T. A. Serv. ' 12,8.3-V
(B. T. A. mem.).
185. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280, 287 (1933). This view is not derived from
any interpretation of Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 303 U. S. 39 (1939), which
would render the estate tax and the gift tax mutually exclusive in incidence, or prac-
tically so. See Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176 (1943) and Robinette v. Helvering,
318 U. S. 184 (1943), as to the evil days which have come upon this interpretation. Cf.
Commissioner v. Solomon, 124 F. (2d) 86, 88 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
186. See Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 44 (1939); 2 PAUL, Op.
cit. supra note 7, § 15.04.
187. SEN. RxP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 243.
188. H. J. REs. 365, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); Pub. L. No. 68, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1943) § 10.
189. See 88 CONG. R c. 8305-06 (1942). The lor amendment, introduced and ex-
plained by Senator Taft, was agreed to in conference, subject to technical changes in
language. Co-.F. REP. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 71 (Amendment No. 418).
190. See U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(b). Moreover, the statutory language is broad
enough to free from gift tax the release of powers created after October 21, 1942, the
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tion.00 However, nothing is said concerning the exercise of a power, and
general powers exercised prior to such date should, it seems, be held tax-
able under the prior provisions of the gift tax.' 91
The statute provides that a release or exercise of a power of appoint-
ment is a taxable gift even though the power is exercisable in conjunction
with another person and regardless of whether the latter has a substan-
tial adverse interest. There is a deviation here from the usual pattern of
gift tax liability. A person who creates a trust, reserving a power to
revoke with the consent of another person, effects a taxable gift if the
other person has a substantial adverse interest. 10 2  The same transfer
attracts an estate tax,0 3 subject to the allowance of a credit for gift tax
paid. 0 4 However, the deviation is warranted. In the case of powers of
appointment a use of the "substantial adverse interest" concept for gift
tax purposes would permit the total avoidance of both estate and gift tax
by the holder of the power through an inter vivos exercise or release. It
is no longer a question merely of choosing the appropriate occasion for
imposing tax as in the case of the settlor."'0
date of enactment of the 1942 Act. Undoubtedly there was no real intention of pro-
ducing this uncalled for result, as indicated by the more circumscribed language of
the estate tax amendment. See p. 544 infra.
191. Compare discussion at p. 535 supra. This is the position taken in U. S. Treas.
Reg. 79, Art. 2(b).
192. Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940) ; see Higgihs
v. Commissioner, 129 F. (2d) 237, 241 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S, 658
(1942). Cf. George Washington, Sr., C. C. H. 1943 T. C. Serv. g 13,021 (T. Ct. mem.).
But cf. First National Bank of Birmingham v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 816 (N. D.
Ala. 1939). See 2 PAUL, Op. cit. supra note 7, § 17.09.
193. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (1935).
194. Sections 813(a) (1) and (2), 936. The settlor is freed from income tax. See
PAUL, Op. cit. supra note 87, at 213; Ray, supra note 23, at 1324. Here we meet one (if
the sore spots of tax incidence which emphasizes the need for some correlation of the
income, estate and gift taxes. See Commissioner v. Beck's Estate, 129 F. (2d) 243, 246
(C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F. (2d) 237, 239 (C. C. A. 1st,
1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 658 (1942) ; Commissioner v. Prouty, 115 F. (2d)
331, 337 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); MAGILL, THE IMPAcT OF FEDERAL TAXEs (1934) 31;
1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 88, 285, c. 17; Greenfield, Correlation of Federal Income,
Estate and Gift Taxes (1942) 16 TEMPLE L. Q. 194; Griswold, supra note 62; Merry,
Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Concept of a Transfer (1940) 38 Micix. L. Rrv. 1032;
Wales, Indian Gifts (1939) 34 ILL. L. REv. 119; Warren, Correlation of Gift and Estate
Taxes (1941) 55 HARV. L. REv. 1; Comment (1940) 40 COL. L. REV. 467.
195. There is no tax if the trustee is a corporation, since the gift tax statute embraces
only transfers by individuals. See 2 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 15.05.
The gift tax, like the estate tax, now extends to a trustee's power to appoint prop-
erty unless the power falls within either of the exempt categories. Future grants of
authority must be carefully drawn and carefully accepted. It is advisable to note that t
resignation may incur a gift tax if the substantive result is a release of the power. Here
again complications intrude where the power is held by more than one trustee, empha-
sizing the need for clear limitation of trustees' authority. Also, as in the case of the
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The gift tax section raises the inevitable question of correlation with
the estate tax.'" On the whole, the relationship between the two taxes
with respect to powers of appointment is fairly clear. If the donee exer-
cises or releases the power during his lifetime, there is no estate tax lia-
bility unless, for example, the release or exercise is in contemplation of
death or the donee retains a life estate in the appointive property., 7
Furthermore, if the power is exercisable only by will, the power is taxable
both'as a gift and a death transfer only if the power is released, since an
inter vivos exercise is forbidden.
There is one aspect of correlation, however, which may occasion some
difficulty in the future. A donee of a general testamentary power may
release it so that he is no longer able to appoint the property to persons
other than his spouse and children.' At his death, therefore, assuming
that such a release is valid under local law,"' he would have a tax-exempt
power. What are the tax consequences of such a partial release? The
regulations, from the taxpayer's standpoint, are disconcertingly specific.
They provide that if a taxable power is released or exercised in such
fashion that it becomes a tax-exempt power, such release or exercise "does
not preclude" the inclusion of the property in the donee's gross estate. It
is then stated, by way of example, that if a donee of a general power
reduces it to an exempt power, the appointive property is taxable under
section 811(f) (1) (B) or (C). 2 "0 These provisions tax an exercise or
release made in contemplation of death, and an exercise or release intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death or reserving to the de-
estate tax, a power to invade principal for one's own benefit is a taxable power of ap-
pointment. However, gift tax liability attaches only if the holder of the power releases
it. If he exercises the power there is no gift since he simply becomes outright owner of
the property and from a tax point of view he is already the owner.
The release of a power to invade, which is not presently exercisable, is analugous
to a transfer by gift of a contingent interest which never ripens. Such transfer is subject
to gift tax, determined by the value of the contingent interest at the date of transfer,
and the subsequent disappearance of the interest and consequent collapse of the gift are
irrelevant. Goodwin v. 'McGowan, 47 F. Supp. 798 (NV. D. N. Y. 1942). The release
of a contingent power should be similarly taxable. In valuing the transfer one should
make due allowance for the contingency, but Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U. S. 184
(1943), seems to indicate that if the contingency is beyond the actuarial act no allowance
is in order.
196. See note 194 supra.
197. See p. 501 supra. Compare Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F. (2d) 237, 241
(C. C. A. 1st, 1942), cert. denied. 317 U. S. 658 (1942); Commissioner v. Marshall,
125 F. (2d) 943, 948 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942); Herzog v. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 591.
595-96 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; 2 PAUL, Op. cit. supra note 7, § 17.12.
198. One purpose of such a release, apart from tax considerations, might be the desire
to avoid the principle that the donee's creditors may reach assets appointed under a gen-
eral power.
199. This question is considered at p. 550 infra.
200. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (3).
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cedent the income from the property or the right "to designate the per-
sons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom."
This is not all. On the gift tax side it is provided that the reduction in
scope of a taxable power to a tax-exempt power is also a release subject
to gift tax.20'
Those who have drunk deeply-or too deeply-from Estate of Sanford
v. Commissioner 202 Will obviously be horrified.23  The same appointive
property is taxed both under the gift tax and the estate tax despite the fact
that the Supreme Court in the Sanford case frowned at such "double taxa-
tion." 24 But all illusions must come to an end sometime. The Supreme
Court has recently held in Smith v. Shaughnessy 20 that there is no prin-
ciple of mutual exclusiveness. We are now informed that "the gift tax
amounts in some instances to a security, a form of down-payment on the
estate tax which secures the eventual payment of the latter; it is in no sense
double taxation;" and "Congress has provided as its plan for integrating
the estate and gift taxes this system of secured payment on gifts which
will later be subject to the estate tax." 200 A good deal of broad language
in the Sanford case 207 is conveniently forgotten.
But the Sanford case may still be significant in another respect. As
interpreted in Smith v. Shaughnessy it represents the principle that a
transfer in trust is not a gift as long as the grantor retains the power "to
201. U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(b). These provisions apply only to releases after
February 29, 1944, in view of the legislative grace period allowed for tax-free release..
See pp. 544-45 infra.
202. 308 U. S. 39 (1939). In this case the Supreme Court held that the settlor's
surrender of a power to revest the trust corpus in himself did not constitute a taxable
gift as long as he retained the power to alter the beneficial interests for persons other
than himself. See also the companion case of Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U. S. 54
(1939) ; and Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F. (2d) 954 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), ccrt. denied, 302
U. S. 756 (1937) ; cf. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280 (1933). The Court was
deeply impressed with the fact that the retention of the latter power subjected the trust
to estate tax, and refused to sanction a gift tax in addition. See Porter v. Commissioner,
288 U. S. 436 (1933) ; cf. Chickering v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d) 254 (C. C. A. 1st,
1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 636 (1941); Guggenheim v. Helvering, 117 F. (2d) 469
(C. C. A. 2d, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 621 (1941) ; Commissioner v. Chase National
Bank, 82 F. (2d) 157 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 552 (1936). See I
PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, § 7.09.
203. See, e.g., Friedland, Irrevocable Trusts (1942) 20 TAxEs 651; Nossaman, Taxes
on Gifts Subject to Contingencies (1942) 20 TAXES 650.
204. The Sanford decision has been criticized at length in Warren, supra note 194,
at 12.
205. 318 U. S. 176 (1943). See also Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U. S. 184 (1943);
United States v. Frank, 133 F. (2d) 1009 (C. C. A. 7th, 1943) ; Commissioner v. Mar-
shall, 125 F. (2d) 943 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) ; Commissioner v. McLean, 127 F. (2d) 942
(C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
206. 318 U. S. at 179.
207. 308 U. S. at 44-46.
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modify the terms of the arrangement so as to make other disposition of
the property." 205 It is therefore arguable that a gift tax does not attach
to a partial release since the donee still retains the right to designate the
ultimate takers of the property. However, as Smith -.,. Shaughnessy dis-
closes, it is not too difficult to side-step the Sanford case. The Supreme
Court. in the latter case, was concerned "with a question to which Con-
gress has given no answer in the words of the statute," and the Court
supplied an answer "in conformity to the course of judicial decision
applicable to a unified scheme of taxation of gifts whether made inter
vivos or at death." .200 Here, however, the gift tax statute explicitly pro-
vides that a release of a power of appointment is a taxable transfer and
that a power of appointment is any power to appoint property other than
two stated exceptions. It seems to follow, therefore, that if the donee
leaves himself merely an exempt power, he has fully released his power
of appointment to the complete satisfaction of the gift tax language. Re-
gardless of any residue of control, the power of appointment no lunger
exists.2 10  Nor is this conclusion unduly embarrassed by the argument,
advanced by the Supreme Court in the Sanford case,"' that secondary
liability for gift tax would be incurred by persons who might never
receive the property.21 - It has been held that a taxable gift may occur
despite "the indefiniteness of the eventual recipient."
-2 13
208. 318 U. S. at 181.
209. 308 U. S. at 48.
210. Compare Alexander, supra note 123, at 752.
211. 308 U. S. at 46. But cf. Warren, supra note 194, at 17. The Court also reasoned
that if a trust were considered a completed gift despite the donor's power to change
beneficiaries, it might be plausibly maintained that a gift in trust for charities was
deductible even though th donor could at a later date route the property to private
beneficiaries. However, the gift to charity would fail here because of uncertainty. The
completeness of a gift for purposes of taxability is not identical with c,?.mpleteness for
purposes of the charitable deduction. For example, if a donor created a trust, reserving
a power solely in another to alter beneficial interests, the transfer would be a ta.able
gift. Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F. (2d) 237 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942), ecrt. denicd, 317
U. S. 658 (1942) ; Hernstadt v. Hoey, 47 F. Supp. 874 (S. D. N. Y. 1942); Albert D.
Lasker, 1 T. C. 208 (1942). See 2 PAuL, op. cit. .supra note 7, § 17.11. Cf. Herzog v.
Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 591 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941). But the donor would not be entitled
to a charitable deduction, even if a charity were named initial beneficiary, b2cause of
the outstanding power of amendment. Martha F. Mason, 46 B. T. A. 04q2 (1942).
212. Section 1009 provides that if the gift tax "is not paid when due, the dunce of any
gift shall be personally liable for such tax to the extent of the value of such gift." The
period allowed the Commissioner to proceed against the donee exceeds by one year the
period applicable to the donor. Evelyn N. Moore, 1 T. C. 14 (1942).
213. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U. S. 183, 187 (1943), appruving U. S. Treas.
Reg. 79, Art. 3 (1936 ed.). See also Aldus C. Higgins, 44 B. T. A. 1123, 1130
(1941), aff'd, 129 F. (2d) 237, 242 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 653
(1942) ; Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F. (2d) 943, 946 (C. C. A. 2d, 1942) ; Herz.,g
Y. Commissioner, 116 F. (2d) 591, 594-95 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); dissenting opini.n of
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It is reasonable, however, to impose only the gift tax or the estate
tax unless there is some additional factor which renders both taxes
applicable. As indicated above, the partial release of a taxable power so
that it is exercisable only for the benefit of the exempt class of relatives
fits snugly into the language of the gift tax statute. The choice of the
gift tax is also supportable by the policy underlying the statute. The
donee of a taxable power is regarded as owner of the property, for al-
though he may not enjoy all the fruits of ownership, he has sufficient
nibbles at the fruits to justify such treatment. 14 If he transforms his
taxable power into an exempt power, he has surrendered "tax" owner-
ship, and is left with a power which would have been immune from
estate tax if granted to him originally.211 Other factors may produce,
in addition, an estate tax, as, for example, the retention of a life estate in
the appointive property. The donee's position in this case seems to be
analogous to that of a grantor who has reserved a life estate and surren-
dered all control, once it is agreed that the discretion reposing in a donee
of a "tax-exempt power is not" tax control.
The estate tax also has reasonable claims to recognition. It is expressly
provided that a release of a power intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at death is subject to estate tax. And upon the basis of
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company 216 it may be concluded that the
release does not take effect until death strikes. It is also provided that a
Judge Augustus N. Hand in Hesslein v. Hoey, 91 F. (2d) 954, 957 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U. S. 756 (1942).
214. Compare Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 678 (1933).
215. This view is not necessarily opposed by § 811(f) (1) (C) (ii), which subjects to
estate tax a release of a power whereby the donee retains "the right, either alone or In
conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy tile
property or the income 'therefrom." The legislative background of this provision dates
back to the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931, 46 STAT. 1516, c. 454, when Congress
provided for an estate tax upon "a transfer under which the transferor has retained for his
life or any period not ending before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the
income from, ,the property or (2) the right to designate the persons who shall possess
or enjoy the property or the income therefrom . . . ." This Resolution was intenided
to overrule May v. Heiner, 281 U. S. 238 (1930), and related decisions holding that a
transfer reserving to the grantor a life estate was not subject to estate tax. Section
803(a) of the 1932 Act amended the Resolution in various respects in order to "clarify"
it and section 803 (b) added a similar provision with respect to powers of appointment.
See H. R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 47 (1939-1 CUM. BULL., Pt. 2, p.
491); SEN. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) 50 (1939-1 Cu,. BULL., Pt. 2, p.
532). The Resolution's reference to the decedent's reservation of a right to designate who
shall possess or enjoy the property or its income was apparently intended to embrace a
reservation analogous to a life estate, i.e., the right to designate the person who would
enjoy or possess the property for the duration of the decedent's life. A reserved power
to determine the eventual takers of property after death was already taxable under sub-
sections (c) and (d) of the prior versions of section 811 of the Code.
216. 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
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release is taxable if the decedent retains the right "either alone or in con-
junction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or
enjoy the property or the income therefrom." " It therefore seems to
follow that the donee of a taxable power can escape estate tax only by a
total release, and that the gift tax does not come into play until such a
release occurs. Furthermore, if a donee effected a partial release so that
his power was rendered tax-exempt, and thereafter released his reduced
power,21" both acts of release would have to be correlated in order to
spell out a release of a power of appointment subject to gift tax.2 12
The Treasury's interpretation that both the gift and estates taxes are
applicable may be examined in another light. If an owner of property
creates a trust, retaining broad powers of revocation and amendment, and
thereafter narrows his power so that he can merely reallocate portions of
the property among his children, he is not liable for the gift tax23 and
the trust property is included in his gross estate at death.2- ' On the other
hand, if a donee of a general power of appointment narruws his appuintive
authority in similar fashion he is subjected to the burden of both the
estate and the gift tax. There does not seem to be any policy considera-
tion in support of this difference in tax incidence, and policy is a for-
midable factor where ambiguities are to be resolved.--
217. But see note 215 supra.
218. As to the releasability of special powers, see note 231 infra.
219. Compare Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (139. There is
the additional consideration that if only a gift tax is imposed upon the reduction of a
taxable power to an excepted power, holders of powers of appointment may occupy a
better position than complete owners of property. The latter must transfer their prolperty
entirely to escape estate tax, while the former could retain authrrity to determine the
devolution without paying any estate tax.
220. See Doris Bond Sherman, 41 B. T. A. 893 (1940) ; cf. Commissioner v. Warner,
127 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 9th, 1942) ; Leonard A. Yerkes, 47 B. T. A. 431 (1942).
221. Commissioner Y. Chase National Bank, 82 F. (2d) 157 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cerl.
denied, 299 U. S. 552 (1936); see 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 318.
222. The gift tax amendments do not include any provision which revises the section
allowing a deduction for contributions to charity. § 1004(a) (2), (b). As indicated in
the committee reports, H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); S:;. REP. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 242, such a provision is unnecessary since the release
or exercise of a power of appointment is now considered a transfer by gift. The e.xpan-
sion of the gift concept necessarily broadens the tax lien imposed on gifts, extends per-
sonal liability in the case of appointive property, § 1009, and places the recipients of tax-
able property within the transferee category. § 1025(f). The appointee or taker in de-
fault, as transferee, may be pursued by the Government after the statute of limitatins
has run with respect to the holder of the power. Cf. Evelyn X. Mo.ore, I T. C. 14 (1942) ;
Ralph Perldns, C. C. H. 1943 T. C. Serv. I 13,037 (T. Ct. mem4. See, further, Fletcher
Trust Co., 1 T. C. 798 (1943), in the event that the appointment is in trust. The
amendments do not provide for apportionment of the gift tax burden. Since the gift
tax is now imposed on powers not exercisable for the benefit of the holder of the pVwer,
it may be advisable to add a provision making the appointive property ultimately liable
for the portion of tax attributable to the power. There is no questiun of interpretatkn
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EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENTS
A statute which seriously restricts the pleasant pastures of avoidance
raises a delicate question: How should one treat those who have already
managed to get into the pastures? There is another, perhaps equally deli-
cate, question: How is one to distinguish between those who have been
motivated by avoidance and those who have not, assuming that the dis-
tinction should be made? The latter question is particularly relevant in
connection with powers, since it is often impossible to effect a timely
release in order to escape the impact of a serious change in tax policy.
The bill, as passed by the House, provided that (1) the estate tax
amendments were applicable only to estates of decedents dying after the
date of enactment of the bill; (2) powers other than those exercisable in
favor of the decedent, his estate, his creditors, or the creditors of his
estate, 23 were not subject to the amendments if (a) the power was re-
leased by the decedent before two years after the date of enactment, or
if (b) the power was exercised on or before the date of enactment; and
(3) the amendments did not apply to any power released on or before
the date of enactment. 224 The provision that all powers are immune from
tax if released prior to the date of enactment may have been motivated
by a desire to avoid any charges that the amendments violated due pro-
cess because of retroactivity.225 The benefits, nevertheless, accrued to
those holders of general powers who effected timely releases for the very
purpose of avoiding tax under the amendments.220 While the new statute
did not tax a release per se, the relinquishment of an otherwise taxable
power after passage of the Act would naturally inspire the argument that
the holder acted in contemplation of death because the purpose of the
release was avoidance of estate tax. 27 The gift tax amendments had
similar provisions with respect to outstanding powers and previously re-
leased powers,228 but since the substantive changes were not effective
as to previously taxed property, since the deduction of the value of such property is not
recognized under the gift tax.
223. See Eisenstein, supra note 1, at 310, 314.
224. See H. R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 161. The report warned:
"A power exercised by a decedent dying after the date of enactment of this section in a
will executed prior to such date is considered to be exercised after such date." See also
SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 234.
225. Compare Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938).
226. Compare Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440 (1928), holding that the gift
tax statute, if applied to gifts made while the conference report on the statute was
pending, was repugnant to due process. The decision would probably not be followed
today.
227. Compare First Trust & Deposit Co. v. Shaughnessy, 134 F. (2d) 940 (C. C. A.
2d, 1943) ; Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F. (2d) 794 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938),
cert. denied, 306 U. S. 648 (1939) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.16. See 1 PAUL, op. cit.
supra note 7, §§ 6.06, 6.15.
228. See H. R. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) § 452(b).
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until January 1, 1943, holders of all powers had an additional period of
time, after the passage of the bill, to execute a release.
2-"
The Senate Finance Committee made two significant changes with
respect to the estate tax. -30 Powers not exercisable in favor of the donee,
his estate or creditors were absolved from tax if the powers were not
exercised after the date of enactment of the bill. This change made
"allowance for the inability to release various nongeneral powers under
applicable local law," 231 and in this respect was a marked improvement
of the House measure. 32 The other change was apparently an attempt
to assist those who were unable to avoid tax by a timely release because of
a legal disability, as, for example, infancy or insanity. It was provided
that the amendments are not applicable to powers exercisable in favor
of the decedent, his estate or creditors, created on or before the date of
enactment, if at that date the donee of such power is under a legal dis-
ability to release it, until six months after the disability ceases.2 For
M'9. Pub. L. No. 753, § 451.
230. The Committee also made technical changes in language.
231. CONF. REP. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 69 (Amendment No. 399).
See also SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 56. According to the Restate-
ment, a special power is not releasable unless (a) the power is exercisable at the date
of release and all the takers in default are persons to whom an effective appointment
could then be made, or (b) the donor in creating the power manifests his intention that
the power shall be releasable. 3 REsTTEmiENT, PROPERTY (1940) §§334, 335. CI. Gray,
Release and Discharge of Powers (1911) 24 -LTh,, L. RE%% 511; Comment (1910) 23
HA,. L. REv. 394. But compare the more liberal views expressed in Thorington v.
Thorington, 82 Ala. 489, 1 So. 716 (1887) ; Baker v. Wilmert, 288 Ill. 434, 123 X. E.
627 (1919); Columbia Trust Co. v. Christopher, 133 Ky. 335, 117 S. AV. 943 (1909);
1 SimEs, FuruRE IxTmx sTs (1936) § 277 et seq.; Simes, Powcrs in Trust and the Ter-
mination of Powers by the Donee (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 63, 211; Nossaman, Release of
Powers of Appointtent (1943) 56 HARv. L. REV. 757, 702. See also the statutes enacted
in Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island, cited in note 245, in!ra.
232. In view of Helvering v. Grinnell, 294 U. S. 153 (1935), an appointment to takers
in default of shares identical with those designated in default of an appointment is an
"exercise." The question of "passing" is entirely irrelevant. See Eisenstein, supra note 1,
at 318. Cf. Commissioner v. Rogers, 135 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
233. This provision, because of somewhat ambiguous phrasing, might create an infer-
ence that an exercise as well as a release before the termination of the six-month period
would escape tax. However, it seems clear that the intention was to put those unable
to effect a timely release because of a legal disability in the same position as those who
were able to move swiftly and avoid tax. Furthermore, it would be extremely incon-
gruous to allow an additional period for the exercise of a general power, and provide
a rigid rule that nongeneral powers, if exercised, are taxable, even if the holder of the
power was under a legal disability when the bill was enacted. The regulations take the
more sensible position that the provision only extends tile time allowed to effect a tax-free
release. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.24(b)(3)(iii). See also McLucas, Powers of
Appointment and the 1942 Revenue Act (1943) 21 T.%xEs 198, 239. As a result, however,
a donee of a taxable power who is mentally incompetent on the date of enactment but
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the purpose of this provision, a person in the armed forces of the United
States is under a legal disability until the termination of the present
war.2"4 Similar changes were made with respect to the gift tax.28
The applicability provisions, as approved by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, did not remain unchanged. Senator Taft introduced a floor
amendment, approved by the Senate, which made the estate tax amend-
ments inapplicable to powers released prior to January 1, 1943.280 The
purpose of this change was to afford persons more time to relinquish
their powers. It was felt that no one "except the very well informed per-
sons who are able to maintain a large staff of expert lawyers" would
be aware of the opportunity to release his power and escape tax. In addi-
tion it was feared that a release after the date of enactment would be
considered made in contemplation of death.237 The Senate also accepted
another amendment offered by the same Senator which expressly made
certain that inter vivos releases would not be taxed as gifts under the
existing gift tax law. The House agreed to these floor amendments and
the other Senate changes, subject to certain technical amendments.285
Efforts to aid donees of existing powers did not terminate with the final
enactment of the 1942 Act on October 21, 1942. Congress subsequently
who previously executed his will while competent to do so would be reached by the
new law.
234. Pub. L. No. 753, § 403(d) (2). See SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1942) 234. The regulations, U. S. Treas. Reg, 105, § 81.24(b) (3) (ili), require that the
person in the armed forces be in active service on the date of enactment of the Act. The
Senate report and regulations state that "legal disability" includes the disability of an
unborn child.
Pub. L. No. 753, § 507, extending the time for performing certain acts, postponed
because of war, is not broad enuogh to cover releases by donees merely because they are
in the armed forces. This section may, however, be employed to grant al extension of
time to persons not in the armed forces where they are outside the Americas. See
generally, T. D. 5216, 1943 INT. REV. BULL., No. 2, at 53.
235. See SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 242.
236. 88 CONG. REC. 8305-06 (1942).
237. Id. at 8306. See also Hearings before Committee on Finance on H. R. 7378,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 2348.
238. CONF. REP. No. 2586, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) 69 (Amendment No. 399),
71 (Amendment No. 418). Under a conference change, the estate tax amendments do not
apply to unexercised powers where the decedent has died before January 1, 1943. This date
was subsequently changed to July 1, 1943, by H. J. RES. 365, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942),
and to March 1, 1944, by Pub. L. No. 68, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) § 10. The
gift tax floor amendment referred to a "donated power to appoint." The word
"donated," which is not used elsewhere, was dropped in conference. The report, however,
emphasizes that the basic gift tax amendments "apply only to powers received by the
individual from another person, and do not affect the present status of powers reserved
to an individual by himself. See Estate of Sanford v. Comm. (308 U. S. 39
(1939))." There is obviously no intention to affect the law governing reserved powers,,
and the committee statement is simply directed to any confusion which may arise be-
cause the word "donated" was omitted in the section as finally enacted.
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extended by a joint resolution the period allowed for the tax-free re-
lease of a power exercisable in favor of the donee, his estate, or creditors
to June 30, 1943.239 This extension was motivated by a number of fac-
tors: (1) the inability of trustees to adjust their affairs within the period
originally allowed; (2) the short period otherwise remaining "for the
solution of many problems of law requiring further study by the holders
of powers and their legal advisers"; (3) the probable failure of the regu-
lations, because of their late appearance, to furnish any practical assistance
to taxpayers.240 1ore recently Congress has granted an additional ex-
tension of time terminating on February 29, 1944.!!41
RELEASABILITY UNDER LOCAL LAW
Congressional generosity toward holders of existing general powers is
rooted in the implicit assumption that such powers are releasable in all
jurisdictions. While Congress was beset with doubts where special powers
were concerned, it apparently walked with assurance in the realm of
general powers.2 42 Local property law, of course, has the final word on
the releasability of powers24 3 -the same property law which has been
treated so condescendingly in recent Supreme Court opinions.2"1 Tax law
therefore resolves itself into a lowly question of property law and one
must determine whether the Congressional assumption was correct. If,
in a particular jurisdiction, general powers are not releasable, then the
intended relief has been thwarted.
It is no exaggeration to state that there is practically no American law
on the release of powers of appointment, if by law one means what courts
have said in the past. -4  Uncertainties, however, are considerably nar-
239. H. J. REs. 365, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942). Donees under a legal disability on
the date of enactment of the 1942 Act are given an additional six-month period after the
disability ceases. Furthermore, if the donee dies prior to the expiration of such six-
month period and the power is unexercised, there is no tax. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105,
§ 81.24(b) (3) (ii); U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(b) (3). Literally interpreted, Pub. L.
No. 753, § 453 (b) (2) and (c), as amended by the Resolution, would not prevent the im-
position of a gift tax under the previous law if the donee under a disability released his
power after July 1, 1943. However, the gift tax regulations provide that such a release
is not taxable and therefore waive any claim under the old law.
240. See H. R. RaP. No. 2708, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942); SE.z. Rra. N o. 1832,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) ; 88 CONG. REa 9720, 9812 (1942).
241. Pub. L. No. 63, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) § 10.
242. The regulations, however, are prepared against the possibility that local law
may prohibit the release of a general power. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 8124(b) (3) (iii);
U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2(b) (3).
243. Compare Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154, 161 (1942).
244. See, e.g., Smith v. Shaughnessy, 31S U. S. 176, 180 (1943); Helvering v.
Clifford, 309 U. S. 331, 334 (1940) ; Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 105, 118 (1940);
United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363, 369 (1939).
245. See Nossaman, Release of Powers of Appointment (1943) 55 HAEv. L. Rv.
757. In general, there is hardly any American law of powers of appointment. But tax
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rowed since the question of release is critical only with respect to general
powers.246 And general powers are a problem only where they are exclu-
sively testamentary. 47 A bare handful of decisions has returned the ver-
dict that general testamentary powers are releasable 24' even though the
donor evidently intended the donee to retain his discretion until "the mo-
ment of inevitable surrender." 240 This result has been sharply criticized
as a betrayal of the donor's trust and as sanctioning appointments by deed
where the donor ordained that only a testamentary appointment would
do.250 Even those who have accepted the rule that general testamentary
law is now functioning as a stimulant. Thus nine states have, as a result of the
federal tax changes, enacted statutes governing the release of powers of appointment.
Ill. Laws 1943, p. 59; Iowa Laws 1943, p. 319; Md. Laws 1943, c. 870; Mass. Laws 1943,
c. 152; N. J. Laws 1943, p. 51; N. Y. Laws 1943, c. 476; N. C. Laws 1943, p. 427; Pa.
Laws 1943, p. 677; R. I. Laws 1943, p. 93.
246. See, in connection with special powers, note 231 supra.
247. General powers exercisable by deed or will are clearly releasable. 3 RESTATr-
MENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 334.
248. Johnson v. Harris, 202 Ky. 193, 259 S. V. 35 (1924); Merrill v. Lynch, 173
Misc. 39, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 514 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288, 156
Atl. 84 (1931) ; Governor v. Bowen, 15 R. I. 549, 10 At. 589 (1887). See 3 RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 334; 1 SIMEs, op. cit. supra note 231, § 282; Alexander, supra
note 123, at 749; Nossaman, supra note 245, at 761. But cf. Learned v. Tallmadge, 26
Barb. Ch. 443 (N. Y. 1856); Gray, supra note 231, at 530. It has been suggestcd that
Lyon v. Alexander could have been decided on narrower grounds. See Comment (1935)
48 HARV. L. REv. 1202, 1245. The special considerations evoked by powers appendant,
assuming that they still exist [but see 3 RESTATEIMENT, PROPERTY (1940) § 325] are not
considered here. See Note (1932) 76 A. L. R. 1430, 1437; Nossaman, supra note 245,
at 760. Statutes in Iowa, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island sanction the release of general powers. See note 245
supra.
249. Compare United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 117 (1931).
250. See Gray, supra note 231, at 531; Note (1932) 76 A. L. R. 1430. The desire to
protect the donor's intention that the appointment shall be testamentary has borne fruit
in decisions refusing to enforce specifically a contract to appoint property. Wilks v.
Burns, 60 Md. 64 (1882); Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Mortimer, 219 N. Y. 290,
114 N. E. 389 (1916), (1917) 30 HAR. L. REv. 401; Beyfus v. Lawley [1903] A. C. 411.
There is conflict as to whether the disappointed promisee is entitled to damages, Coin.-
pare Northern Trust Co. v. Porter, 368 Ill. 256, 13 N. E. (2d) 487 (1938), 51 HARV.
L. REv. 1451, with Re Parkin, [1892] 3 Ch. 510. See 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940)
§340; Comment (1917) 17 COL. L. REV. 235. The question is left open in the Mortimer
case. However, an exception is made where the promise is to a taker in default, for In
such case the promise to appoint not less than, or not to reduce the share in default below,
a stated sum is effective as a release. In re Evered, [1910] 2 Ch. Div. 147; 3 RESTATE-
MENT, PROPERTY (1940) §336, comment b, §340, comment d; cf. Coffin v. Cooper, 2
Drew. & Sm. 365 (Ch. 1865) ; Palmer v. Locke, 15 Ch. D. 294 (1879). But cf. In re
Cooke, [1922] 1' Ch. 292; In re Bradshaw, [1902] 1 Ch. 436; see Thacker v. Key, L. R.
8 Eq. 408, 414 (1869). 'See further, (1933) 77 SOL J. 295, and (1938) 82 SOL. J. 848, for
a discussion of whether a release can be mutually revoked. If the donee covenants to ap-
point a stated portion of the property to one of the takers in default and fails to fulfill
such promise by appointment or failure to appoint, the promisee is entitled to the amount
promised him, and the others must receive at least an equal amount, assuming that they
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powers may be released are sometimes a bit apologetic for their posi-
tion.- - But principle is not entirely on the side of non-releasability. A
rule that the donee may release his power "will operate in the interests
of freer alienability of property." 12 Moreover, the general testamentary
power is almost equivalent to full ownership and the ability to release is
a reasonable reflection of the donee's broad control." '  The Restatement
-accordingly declares that a general power is releasable even though the
donor expressly provides that the power shall not be released.2
On the whole, it is fair to conclude that general testamentary powers,
in view of the historical support afforded by English precedent, - ' will
be held releasable. Even property law,2 ' as well as tax law, has its mo-
ments of practicality. If the release is valid, the appointees or takers in
default enjoy their property in toto, as Congress clearly intended. If the
release is invalid, the tax collector's reaper slices off a goodly portion of
the appointive property. Faced with these alternatives, a court has little
choice as to where its judgment shall fall.2 Even if one were particu-
larly concerned with the donor's intention, the most reasonable conclusion
would be that if he had the choice he would select the road to tax immu-
nity. There is little to fear from the claim that the release is invalid since
the donee intended to benefit himself indirectly by reducing his taxes.
all share equally in default of appointment. However, such a release should not be given
effect beyond the specific sum promised to the taker in default, because the power still
remains as to the balance. For example, the donee could appoint all the prcperty ti the
promisee. See In re Evered, stpra; 3 REsT.%TEME:\T, PROPERTY (1940) §335, Illustra-
tion IV, and comment b. The decisions sustaining a release of a general testamentary
power and those refusing to enforce contracts to appoint under such powers are essen-
tially irreconcilable in rationale. Cf. (1910) 23 HAnv. L. REV. 394, 395. But "a page of
history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349
(1921). See, however, McLucas, mipra note 233, at 242.
251. See 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY (1940) §334, comment a.
252. Simes, supra note 231, at 214.
253. "No one has any interest in a general power of appointment except the donee
of the power." Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288, 291. 156 AtI. 84, 85 (1931). The same
decision emphasizes that the donor has relinquished "all dead hand dominion over the
property."
254. 3 RESTATEMENT, PRoPERT" (1940) §334, comment b.
255. See Note (1932) 76 A. L. R. 1430, 1433. In England a statute provides: "A
person to whom any power, whether coupled with an interest ,,r nut, is given may by
deed release, or contract not to exercise, the power." 15 & 16 GRo. V, c. 20, § 155.
At the present time all powers, except powers in trust, are releasable. In the absence
of statute the English courts had concluded that all powers, except powers in trust and
possibly powers merely collateral, were releasable. See SImEs, op. cit. mpra noe 231,
§ 279 et seq.
256. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 285 Ky. 1, 146 S. W.
(2d) 3 (1940).
257. Compare Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the Ncrw Reveure Act (1943)
56 IH{Av. L. REv. 739, 740. A court might be obsessed by serious doubts in the case .f
spendthrift provisions fettering the corpus as well as the income.
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Even if such an intention were otherwise fatal208 the truth of the matter
is that the appointees or takers in default have also profited by the release.
In view of this dearth of authority, taxpayers should be greatly re-
lieved by the Treasury's decision to give them the benefit of any doubt.
The regulations state:
"It is presumed that all general powers are releasable, unless the
local law on the subject is to the contrary; and it is presumed that
the method employed to release the power is effective, unless it is
not in accordance with the local law on the subject (or, in the
absence of such local law, is not in accordance with the local law
relating to similar transactions) ." 250
In short, if local decisional or statutory law is silent, the release will be
recognized.20 ° Furthermore, the presumption that a general power is
releasable should ordinarily apply even if local decisions have refused to
recognize the release of special powers.20 It is not clear how the Treas-
ury would rule if contrary decisions lived together in the same jurisdic-
tion.262 However, one must still be careful as to the form of release em-
258. But see Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288, 156 Atl. 84 (1931). Compare In re
Somes, [1896] 1 Ch. 250; In re Radcliffe, [1892] 1 Ch. 227, with In re Little, 40 Ch. D.
418 (1889); Cunynghame v. Thurlow, 1 Russ. & M. 436 (Ch. 1832). See, further, Coffin
v. Cooper, 2 Drew. & Sm. 365, 376 (Ch. 1865) ; In re Evered, (1910] 2 Ch. D. 147, 157.
259. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (3) (iii). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art.
2(b).
260. Compare Alexander, supra note 123, at 747.
261. Compare Lyon v. Alexander, 304 Pa. 288, 156 At. 84 (1931), which sustains
the release of a general testamentary power and indicates a contrary view if the power
were special. A local court, in holding a special power not releasable, might indicate in
a dictum that a general testamentary power is also nonreleasable. In that event it seems
that the presumption erected by the regulations might not apply.
262. If the question of local law should arise in a federal court, there are additional
complications. In Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U. S. 154 (1942), it was held that a circuit
court of appeals' determination of local law would not be reversed unless the Supreme
Court had "a definite conviction of error in the conclusion." Cf. Waialua Co. v. Christian,
305 U. S. 91 (1938) ; Matos v. Alonso Hermanos, 300 U. S. 429 (1937). While the Stuart
decision may be a fine display of judicial modesty on the part of the Supreme Court,
such modesty has no place in the determination of tax liability under a federal statute. Cf.
Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149 (1940) ; Helvering v. Leonard, 310 U. S. 80 (1940) ;
Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336, 1350. Nor is the
Court always so modest. See, e.g., Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U. S. 543 (1942) ; cl.
Public Utilities Comm. v, United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U. S. 456 (1943), 56 HARv. L. REV.
825; Texarkana v. Arkansas Gas Co., 306 U. S. 188 (1939); Railroad Comm. v. Los
Angeles Ry. Co., 280 U. S. 145 (1929). The Stuart decision gives the circuit courts,
in many cases, the final word on local law as it affects tax incidence. The authority
of the circuit courts is apparently similar to that enjoyed under the rule of Erie R. R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938). See Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U. S. 109 (1943);
MacGregor v. State Mutual Life Assurance Co., 315 U. S. 280 (1942), relied upon by
the Court in the Stuart decision. Under the rule of the Tompkins decision the federal
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ployed, and since a release is in effect a conveyance, the formal niceties of
conveyancing in the governing jurisdiction would have to be respected
by the donee.2"
Powers to amend or revoke a trust which qualify as taxable powers of
appointment raise a separate question which may be briefly noted. Gen-
erally, it seems, such powers are eliminated by amending the trust instru-
ment. Technically such an amendment may be considered an exercise
rather than a release and therefore ineffective to avoid the new rules of tax
incidence. Such treatment, however, would be completely at odds with
the legislative desire to assist donees of existing general powers, especially
trustees."' If the act of amendment simply eliminates the power to revoke
or amend the trust, it deserves the respect accorded to releases.2 6
The Treasury's liberality in the case of releases is further evidenced
by its treatment of so-called partial releases. If a donee of an existing
general power relinquishes his authority, prior to March 1, 1944, to such
an extent that he thereafter possesses a tax-exempt power,2-c0 he is not
subject to estate or gift tax, assuming that such a partial release is valid
courts are required to look to local decisions and statutes in order to ascertain the g.,vern-
ing law. Ruhlin v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 202 (1938). Several Supreme Court
decisions indicate that the federal courts must conform to decisions of lower state c, urts
rather than draw independent conclusions from the legal materials available. Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169 (1940) ; Six Companies v. Highway District, 311 U. S.
180 (1940); West v. A. T. & T. Co., 311 U. S.223 (1940); Stoner v. New York Life
Insurance Co., 311 U. S. 464 (1940) ; see Huron Corp. v. Lincoln Co., 312 U. S. 1,3, IS9,
n. 7 (1941) ; cf. Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Bank, 306 U. S. 103 (1939). But a decidion
of a lower state court is not necessarily a conclusive datum of local law. LQckhart v.
Garden City Bank & Trust Co., 116 F. (2d) 658 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). In those states where
local statutes or decisions are lacking the federal court should be able to go outside the
jurisdiction involved and, in effect, decide the issue as if it were sitting as a state court.
See Corbin, The Common Law of the United States (1938) 47 Y,X% L. J. 1351; CorLin,
The Laws of the Several States (1941) 50 Y.uxL L. J. 762; Zlinkoff, Eric v Tomp!-iis"
In Relation to the Law of Trade-Marks and Unfair Competition (1942) 42 C*L. L. Rv.
955, 966.
263. For methods of release, see 3 RESTATEMENT, PRoPRTYi (1940) § 336; Nossaman,
supra note 245, at 766; McLucas, supra note 233, at 242; Comment (1936) 45 Yax-
L. J. 516. Of particular interest in the present context are the instruments used in
errill v. Lynch, 173 Misc. 39, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 514 (Sup. Ct. 1939); and In re
Brown's Settlement, [1939] 1 Ch. 944. See also the statutes of Illinois, Iowa, Maryland,
'Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Pennsylvania cited in nte
245 supra, which set forth methods of release.
264. See p. 545 supra.
265. For example, if the trustees bestowed a tax-exempt power of apptAntment upon
another person, and thereafter surrendered their own powers of amendment it might h2
held that they had exercised rather than released the power.
266. "Partial release" may also be used in the sense of a relinquishment of appAritive
authority over a portion of the property rather than a narrowing of such discretion with
respect to the entire property. See 3 REsT.TEuENr, PnoPmTy" (1940) §336(4). See
Atkinson v. Dowling, 33 S. C. 414, 12 S. E. 93 (1S90).
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under local law.267 This position is a wise translation of policy as reflected
by the statutory scheme, since donees of outstanding general powers are
enabled to obtain the benefits of tax immunity which Congress has ex-
plicitly sanctioned. 6 ' There is no reason to discriminate between those
who receive their powers today and those who received them yesterday.
A partial release may often be very desirable apart from tax consequences.
For example, a donee may have a general power with remainders in de-
fault of appointment to his children. If he releases his power in toto the
children receive the property and the devolution is settled. But if he par-
tially releases the power so that he may appoint only to his wife and chil-
dren, he retains the power to provide for his wife as well as his children
in the light of future exigencies.
The only real problem in regard to partial releases is whether they are
recognized by local law. Here again American case law is uncomfortably
silent. But law, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and one must assume that
some governing principle exists impatiently awaiting discovery. In Eng-
land it has been held that a partial release of a power is valid, and prohib-
its an appointment to those excluded by the release.26 9 Once it is assumed
that a total release is permissible there is no reason to hold otherwise with
respect to a partial release.2 ° Realistically speaking, if a release sins
against the donor's intentions, the partial release is the lesser of the two
sins. It is not entirely clear whether the presumption of validity expressed
in the regulations includes partial releases, but the language employed
is broad enough to cover such releases.
267. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.24(b) (3) ; U. S. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 2. There are
similar provisions with respect to persons under a legal disability on the date of enact-
ment of the 1942 Act. See also C. C. H. 1940 Fed. Inh. Tax Serv. 1 6017. The regu-
lations further provide that if a donee desires to bring his power within the "fiduciary"
exception, he will not be deemed to have received a beneficial interest in property merely
because he was the donee of a power created on or before the date of enactment of the
1942 Act. However, one should note that under section 811 (f) (2) (B) of the Code
a donee does not possess an exempt "fiduciary" power if he has acquired a beneficial
interest in the property. The language of the provision seems to exclude the benefit of
the exemption even if the beneficial interest is surrendered prior to March 1, 1944.
268. But cf. Comment (1943) 43 COL. L. Rzv. 76. The donee of an existing special
power which is taxable under the new provisions may be at a disadvantage if his power
is not releasable. His immunity from tax depends upon his abstention from exercise,
and he must therefore abide by the donor's arrangements in default of appointment or
appoint the property and accept the tax consequences. The donee of a partially releasable
general power may narrow it so that it qualifies for exemption and then mold the final
arrangements to suit his own tastes.
269. In re Brown's Settlement, [1939] 1 Ch. 944, involving a special power. See In re
Evered, [1910] 2 Ch. Div. 147, 157; Alexander, supra note 123, at 751.
270. See In re Brown's Settlement, [1939] 1 Ch. 944, 954. Legislation in Illinois, Iowa,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania expressly author-
izes partial releases. The Rhode Island statute is not clear. See note 245, supra.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY
It has been fashionable in the past to devote much attention to consti-
tutional questions when considering tax legislation. especially in the estate
tax field. Although section 403 and its gift tax adjunct, section 452, make
striking changes in the tax incidence of powers, there is little to be said
here. Certainly all doubts with respect to powers created henceforth are
resolved by the Whitney decision "' sustaining an estate tax upon a special
power confined to the decedent-donee's children and the issue of deceased
children.2 2 The case involved an exercised power, but its rationale is
equally applicable to une-xercised special powers. "73 In the words of Mr.
justice Frankfurter, "it is enough that one person acquires economic
interests in property through the death of another person, even though
such acquisition is in part the automatic consequence of death or related
to the decedent merely because of his power to designate to whom and in
what proportions among a restricted class the benefits shall fall." 2' Fur-
thermore, unlike the statute involved in the Whitney case, the federal
amendments expressly sanction tax-exempt powers within specified limita-
tions. An apportionment provision is also included to avoid unfair dis-
tortion of estate tax incidence. Nor are any serious constitutional prob-
lems induced with respect to existing powers. The donee of a power exer-
cisable in favor of himself, his estate or creditors is allowed a periud
of readjustment to escape tax, and donees of other powers are unaffected
if they refrain from exercise.2 5
CONCLUSION
At the outset a significant query was quoted: "For what good reason
should contemporary American taxpayers be allowed to skip a generation
271. Whitney v. State Tax Comm., 309 U. S. 530 (1940).
272. Compare Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U. S. 466 (1907); Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S.
278 (1902), involving succession tax.
273. Compare (1940) 40 CoL L. REv. 923, 927.
274. 309 U. S. at 538-39. See also id. at 539-41; cf. the principle of Porter v. Com-
missioner, 288 U. S. 436 (1933), which also applies where the power to alter bencficial
shares is confined to a specified group. See 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 318-19. But
cf. Leser v. Burnet, 46 F. (2d) 756 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931), to the effect that nothing
passes under a special power, whereas under a general power something passes because
the donee may exercise the power in favor of his creditors.
275. It is not implied that the absence of these legislative concessions would have
constitutional repercussions. Cf. United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363 (1939) ; Salton-
stall v. Saltonstall, 276 U. S. 260 (1928); see Chickering v. Commissioner, 118 F. (2d)
254, 260 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 636 (1941). In the WJhiicy case
the power in question was created in 1899 when New York had a legacy tax and the
challenged estate tax statute was enacted in 1932. Cf. discussion in Schuyler, supra note
43, at 791 et seq. There may be a constitutional tempest in a teapot if local law forbids
the release of a general power. Cf. Alexander, supra note 123, at 754, n. 61.
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or two of estate and inheritances taxes by the use of a verbal form invented
several centuries ago to enable an English gentleman to make a will ?" 27'
The 1942 Act fails to answer; it expressly sanctions the happy process of
skipping. 7 There has been much ado about powers, but now that the
legislative smoke has lifted, we find that what was once accomplished by
the general power may now be done by certain special powers. There will
be grumbling, of course. One must be more cautious in doing things th
tax-wise way and life has become more complicated for tax lawyers, if
not more profitable. But the Government, from a revenue standpoint,
seems to be in about the same position it occupied when avoidance was
simpler. At best it has cleared away the accumulated debris of doctrine
which like all irrelevancies may amuse and beguile but remain conspicu-
ously reticent on the subject of revenue. There is still small comfort in
applying a law whose yield little reflects the transfer of wealth from one
generation to another.
278
The effect of the new statute upon traditional modes of disposition is
obviously drastic. One may safely predict that the general power will
virtually disappear from trust settlements. The effects, moreover, will
be felt beyond the intimate family circle. Creditors' rights, for example,
will also be seriously affected, for established property doctrine has it
that only general powers enable creditors to help themselves to appointive
assets. But these effects hardly constitute respectable objections. A tax
which lives by dominion and control of the decedent must penetrate be-
yond legalistic concepts of ownership. Those who transmit property must
necessarily choose between the benefits of dominion and its disadvantages,
including tax consequences. The 1918 statute subsidized powers of ap-
pointment, making it extremely unwise t6 transmit fee ownership. To that
extent it invaded, as a practical matter, wonted prerogatives of ownership.
The 1942 statute goes one step further in subjecting to tax general and
related powers. At the same time certain special powers are subsidized,
and owners of property are required to decide whether they will select
one device or the other. The new statute narrows once more the tax-free
scope of discretion, but this result is implicit in any effective estate tax
measure.
The new statute places us upon the threshold of a basic truth which
should have been faced many years ago. It is time to realize that trust
settlements are an established form of ownership, and that the devolution
of enjoyment from generation to generation, which it is the function of
such settlements to safeguard, should be treated as a taxable event within
276. McDougal, supra note 43, at 1114.
277. Moreover, tax is entirely avoided if the power is entrusted exclusively to a trust
company, which is not liable for estate and gift taxes.
278. Compare Alexander, supra note 123, at 754-55.
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the framework of the present statute or as a subject for a complementary
levy.2 79 The skipping process does not inhere in powers; it derives from
the tax favoritism based upon the life estate-remainder sequence. As
long as that favoritism exists, the power of appointment has a reasonable
claim to some immunity. Thus little is accomplished by venting legis-
lative wrath upon powers, eradicating the glaring abuses, and stopping at
that point. It is necessary to revise primitive death tax notions which
build upon the necessity of control over property or "strings" upon it,2"5
the vestigial remainders of former ownership. W Ve have been busy elabor-
ating theories which would justify tax at death, and neglecting at the same
time one of the most obvious reasons for imposing tax; the actual en-
joyment of the fruits yielded by property and the termination of such
enjoyment at death. The 1942 amendments will perform legion service
if they transfer the attention lavished upon powers to the fundamental
fallacy of the estate tax and the consequent skipping of one or more
generations. 281
279. Compare Mills, supra note 46; Griswold, supra note 47, at 959. See, in addition,
1 PA U, supra note 7, at 571.
280. See Stone, J., dissenting in Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Company, 296
U. S. 39, 46 (1935). This dissent is now law. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 105 (1940).
281. Only the unfortunate draftsmen would appreciate the difficulties of writing a
statute which destroys the skipping process. For example, one would probably have to
make some adjustments with respect to the decedent's wife, who is of the same generatir.n.
Cf. MIAGiLL, op. cit. supra note 194, at 32; Griswold, stupra note 257, at 741. The tax
status of the wife would also require a re-examination-long overdue--of the deduction for
previously taxed property.
